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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Supreme Court decided two cases, namely
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation' and Air Courier Confer-
ence of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO.2 Both deal
with access to the judiciary for review of agency action. Analysis
of the cases might at first bring to mind the childhood chant of
"Sticks and stones may break my bones but names will never hurt
me," but with the ending transposed to "a hypothetical will never
hurt me." In the legal setting, however, the bravado-laden asser-
tion might not be true: when courts discuss "hypotheticals" the
dicta created can influence the legal process. Dicta must be taken
into account, especially when the digressing court is the Supreme
Court.3 These recent cases dealing with judicial review exemplify
this.
In these two cases, the conservative majority4 forwarded its
vision of the proper role of courts. The majority's view could
tighten judicial access, making it harder for parties other than
those directly regulated by an agency to challenge the agency's
action. Nevertheless, as the justices objecting in Lujan' and Air
Courier6 noted, what the majority did in each was to indulge in
hypotheticals. The hypotheticals in these cases may hurt because
they inappropriately limit review of agency action.
By contrast, the direct holding of Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation does not change traditional standing doctrine, nor does
it create too onerous a barrier to judicial access. Lujan only
directly requires that the plaintiff employ specificity when expres-
sing use of the particular land affected by agency action. This
would enable the plaintiff to be counted among those with an
"injury in fact" and therefore entitled to standing.7 The majority
1. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
2. 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 84 (3d Cir. 1990) (Aldiser, J., concurring) ("I am quick to recognize that Lujan [v.
National Wildlife Fed'n] is not precise precedential authority, but it does nevertheless
constitute a direction that the Court desires us to travel in environmental law cases."), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
4. Although "conservative" and "liberal" have numerous connotations, for the
purposes of this article, "liberal" refers to those in favor of wide access to the judiciary, and
"conservative" refers to those who would limit such access. To a certain extent, this
dichotomy will correlate with those who espouse "liberal" and "conservative" philosophies
as popularly delineated.
5. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3201 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (because the majority found no standing at all, this portion of majority opinion is
"abstract" and inappropriately concerned with scope of relief).
6. Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S. Ct.
913, 922 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring in result).
7. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
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opinion, however, contains two additional propositions: a general
"program" is not an "action" subject to appeal,8 and court inter-
vention might not be "ripe" until actual earth-moving activity
begins on the public lands.9 These ruminations can hamstring
plaintiffs who want early and system-wide relief from illegal
agency actions. Congressionally-granted protection may be
eroded because of Justice Scalia's "abstract" discussion in Lujan.
Similarly, Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Work-
ers Union, AFL-CIO 10 could have been a narrow decision with no
general impact on standing law. The concurrence noted that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not apply to the statute
under which the challenge was brought, and the action was there-
fore unreviewable. 1" Nevertheless, the majority denied standing
under the so-called "zone of interest" test, 12 a prudential limita-
tion on standing. The test demands a particular type of connec-
tion between the plaintiff's injury and the "relevant statute."'13
Strict application of the zone of interest test can limit access to
courts, a phenomenon that changes the nature of the test from one
previously described by the Court as "not... especially demand-
ing." 4 Interestingly, those who merely concurred with the judg-
ment in the opinion containing this easily-met depiction did so
because they thought the case could have been resolved by simple
use of precedent. 5 Therefore, they labelled the Court's com-
ments on the liberality of the test "a wholly unnecessary exegesis
on the 'zone of interest' test."' 6 Except for Justice Stevens,' 7 the
two zone of interest cases reveal reversed fortunes in whether jus-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3190-91.
10. 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991).
11. Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S. Ct.
913, 921 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring in result).
12. Id. at 918-20.
13. Id. at 921. The test arose as a gloss on the Administrative Procedure Act's grant of
standing to those "'suffering legal wrong ... or adversely affected or aggrieved... within
the meaning of the relevant statute .. ." 5 U.S.C. 702 (1988). See Appendix, infra notes
432-36 and accompanying text.
14. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). Justice White wrote this
opinion, which aligns it with liberal tendencies. He was among those who merely
concurred in the original case imposing the zone of interest test. At that point, Justice
White asserted that "injury in fact" should have been sufficient to confer standing, and the
"zone" test unnecessarily tightened judicial access. Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 168 (1970) (Brennan, J., and White, J., concurring).
15. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 410 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
O'Connor, J.).
16. Id. Two explanations of this urge to provide supplemental guidance may exist.
One is systemic: limited opportunities to address problems may force the Supreme Court
to respond to requests for clarification from commentators and lower courts. Peter L.
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1103
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tices are in the majority or dissent, and exemplify the change in
the Supreme Court's philosophical orientation.
In the earlier case, the more conservative justices, who desire
less court access, bemoaned the expansive "hypothetical" of the
more liberal justices.' 8 In the more recent Air Courier, those who
were accused of engaging in hypotheticals before, now accuse the
conservative justices of doing the same.' 9 One reason for these
recurrent digressions is that standing is as important to the current
conservative agenda as it was to the more liberal agenda of prior
courts.2 ° Controlling access to courts has ramifications beyond the
esoteric realm of legal theory; standing and ripeness constraints
affect which laws are enforced and how.
If nothing else, therefore, Air Courier and Lujan reflect a
'"mood" on the part of the Supreme Court to decrease access to
the judiciary.21 The two cases are, however, more than this. They
culminate a trend within the Court, one which embodies con-
servative beliefs that a judge should not freely "make law" but
should allow the politically accountable legislature and executive
to handle majoritarian interests.22 According to these conserva-
tive justices, "separation of powers" 23 doctrine requires the judici-
ary to refrain from usurping either executive or congressional
(1987). The second is more specific to the particular case being decided: ideological
disputes may require supplementation through concurrences. See id. at 1105 n.51.
17. Justice Stevens concurred in both Air Courier and Clarke.
18. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 410 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
O'Connor, J.). Justice Scalia participated in the decision as a judge on the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals. He dissented from that court's treatment of standing. To him, the
plaintiffs were beyond the zone of interest of the statute; he criticized the appellate court
for collapsing the zone test with the injury in fact test. Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1196 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, three of the Air Courier majority are aligned in the
Clarke dispute.
19. Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S. Ct.
913, 921 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring with Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J.). The same
justices dissented in Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3194 (1990). Justice
Brennan had joined them in Lujan. His replacement, Justice Souter, aligned with the
majority in Air Courier, making the restrictive majority more solid. The "liberal" trio,
however, continued to insist on judicial access in their recent dissent in West Va. Univ.
Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991) (contrary to majority, § 1988 attorney fee provision
covers expert fee reimbursement).
20. One example of its importance is the fact that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a third case dealing with such issues. Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals
v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S.
Ct. 2008 (1991). See also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 931 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 2886 (1991) (whether 9th Circuit correctly concluded that separation of
powers forbids Congress passing a law that specified factual results in two pending lawsuits
by name).
21. Cf. Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE LJ. 1487,
1490-91 (1983) ("A standard of judicial review expresses only a 'mood.' ") (footnote omitted).
22. See infra notes 272-81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 242-56 and accompanying text. Restricting standing may enforce
not only the idea of separation of powers, but also sovereign immunity. See infra notes
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prerogatives. Under their influence, the Supreme Court therefore
will employ standing and ripeness to prevent what the conserva-
tives would call government by the judiciary.24 This stance reflects
the private rights model of standing25 and, to a certain extent, uses
standing as a surrogate for sovereign immunity.26
Closing the door to judicial review, however, leads to an impe-
rious executive. This is especially true when combined with the
standard of review of agency action as stated in the 1984 opinion
of Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.28 The so-called Chevron Doctrine requires that, if a statute is
ambiguous, an agency policy should be upheld if it is "reasonable,"
regardless of whether or not either the judge or a member of Con-
gress might believe it is the best or most appropriate interpreta-
tion of the law.
Deference to agency views, when added to limited standing
and strict ripeness rules, makes courts less available to ascertain
the intended meaning of a statute. The remedy for an agency mis-
interpretation of the law, therefore, is to petition Congress to
change the law. While the concept might not be objectionable in
the abstract, in reality Congress cannot micro-manage all regula-
tory programs. The judiciary is as necessary a "check and bal-
ance" on the executive as it is on Congress. To limit access to the
judiciary can realign powers between Congress and the executive
as well as change the judicial role.
To fully understand this proposition, this article will first put
the two recent cases in historical perspective. Section II presents
an overview of basic history and criticisms of standing and ripeness
jurisprudence. Section III takes a detailed look at Lujan and Air
Courier. Employing the discussion in Section II, Section IV shows
that the current tightening is a return to the original individualis-
tic private rights model of standing. The philosophical underpin-
nings and judicial precursors of this position are examined and
critiqued. Section V reviews lower court responses to the two
judicial access cases to see if thresholds are truly being raised.
323-25 and accompanying text. It also may implicate the nondelegation doctrine. See infra
notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
24. See generally C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 862 (1985) (conservative movement generally against government by
the judiciary).
25. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
27. Cf. Arthur S. Miller, The President and the Faithful Execution of the Law, 40
VAND. L. REV. 389, 395 (1987) (Presidents follow the "laws of politics" and judiciary is a
"sapless and toothless branch in such circumstances").
28. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Finally, the Conclusion considers ramifications of the current
Supreme Court trend.
II. THE LAW OF STANDING AND RIPENESS
A. HISTORY OF STANDING LAW AND GENERAL CRITIQUES
Standing is the metaphor29 used to designate a proper party to
a court action: "Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an other-
wise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the ques-
tion of standing to sue."30 Or, as then Judge Scalia put the concept
colloquially: "[Standing] is an answer to the very first question
that is sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of
another's actions: 'What's it to you?'- 31 This article will concen-
trate on standing to seek review of an agency action.32
The jurisprudence of standing has been criticized so heavily
that it may appear to be a camouflage for unprincipled subterfuge
rather than a jurisprudence. 33 Even the Supreme Court has pith-
ily trumpeted not only the doctrine's shortcomings, but also the
Court's own inability to rationally apply the so-called "black let-
ter" law it announces.3 4  Solutions to the problem have been
diverse.35  The purpose of this article is neither to settle this dis-
29. See generally Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) ("metaphors" may trap analysis by forcing a
doctrine to fit the metaphor which, in the case of "standing," resonates with images of
individual action).
30. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
31. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
32. See David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 37, 48-49 (standing analysis complicated by confusing standing to
challenge violation of statute with that required if Constitution at issue).
33. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:1 (K.C.
Davis Pub. Co. 2d ed., 1983). See also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 68, 73 (1984) (arguing that the law of standing is so disjointed that Court itself might
see standing as a manipulable doctrine valuable only for nonjurisdictional ends).
34. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). ("We need not mince words when we say that the concept
of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various
cases decided by this Court which have discussed it .... ").
35. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1046-47 (1968) (injury in fact
not constitutionally required and ideological plaintiff proper); DAVIS, supra note 33, at 24.2
(key to standing is injury in fact); Winter, supra note 29, at 1515 (must recognize
communitarian as well as individual goals); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,
98 YALE L.J. 221, 222-23 (1988) (depends on claim's merits and not injury in fact; for
statutorily based rights, Congress should delineate standing); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1466 (1988) (develop a
public law of standing by recognizing Congress' ability to resolve); David R. Dow, Standing
and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1217-18 (1987) (need citizen standing rather than injury in
fact when societal right violated); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 692 (1973) (for access screening, cost of suit
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pute nor to provide an overreaching theory of standing, but to
understand where the current cases fit in the philosophical and
historical scheme. The history of standing law shows an expansion
from its roots and a new retrenchment.36
1. "Narrow" Standing: Private Rights Model
Initially only plaintiffs suffering wrong to a "legal interest"
had standing to seek judicial review.37 These plaintiffs were of two
types, those with complaints analogous to a common law cause of
action,3 and those granted the right of appeal by being among the
parties classified as "aggrieved" within a particular statute.39 The
two categories created a dichotomy-statutory and nonstatutory
review.40 In both instances, the emphasis was on the individualis-
tic sphere, limiting judicial access to those vindicating private
rights.4 ' This mode of thinking allowed the regulated industry
access to the courts, but made it more difficult for intended benefi-
ciaries of regulation to proceed in court.42
Justices who supported the New Deal and the right of legisla-
tures to experiment with social legislation championed this narrow
should be only barrier; use other doctrines to preclude review based on issues); Nichol,
supra note 33, at 78-79, 92-93 (particularized injury insufficient gauge and must look to
interests created by statute and Constitution); Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 428-29 (1974) (standing not a preliminary matter,
but is actually whether a claim for relief exists); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article
I1: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1698, 1706 (1980) (plaintiff need
only have a personal stake in action sufficient to ensure concrete and adversarial
presentation).
36. For more complete discussion, see Winter, supra note 29, at 1417-58.
37. Tennessee Elec. Power v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) (stating
that no standing exists "unless the right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one
arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege.") (footnote omitted).
38. This type of plaintiff includes those asserting interests created by the Constitution
or a statute if the remedy of court review was traditionally provided. See Scott, supra note
35, at 649-52.
39. See Albert, supra note 35, at 429 (statutory aggrievement also required a "legal
interest" to be invaded).
40. Scalia, supra note 31, at 889 (initial scheme gave broader rights of review under
specific "statutory" grants; nonstatutory review was the generalized right to protect a "legal
interest" by way of mandamus and injunction). See also Antonin Scalia, Sovereign
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions
from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 870 n.13 (1970).
41. Thus referred to as a "private law model." Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1438
(private law model arose from two ideas: belief that judiciary exists to protect common law
interests from government and fear of those sympathetic to regulation that regulation
would be hindered without standing barriers). This is not to be confused with what
Professor Mashaw refers to as "an individualist model," which has expansive judicial access.
Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1131 (1983)
(citizen participation and official accounting for public decisions are available on demand).
42. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1434-36 (evidenced by fact that no separate law of
standing existed; access was based on whether a duty to the plaintiff was violated).
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door to the courthouse. a3 They feared that court interference
could too easily result in invalidation of statutes under the substan-
tive due process of Lochnerian thinking. 4 Therefore, the New
Deal model of an agency included deference to agency expertise
and sought to insulate the agency from central policy control, iso-
late it from the executive, and limit judicial oversight of its activi-
ties.45 Hence, the heyday of the agency under the New Deal has
been referred to as a "technocratic era. "46
2. "Broadened" Access
A period of agency distrust followed the enshrinement of the
agency during the New Deal. Concurrently, two important legal
changes opened access to the courts by those questioning agen-
cies.47 The first building block for increased access was a reinter-
pretion of the types of injuries that could be judicially
cognizable.48 Injuries other than economic harm could suffice.49
The second impetus was interpreting the APA as an independent
source of standing to review agency action when no other remedy
was available.5" This led to the liberally interpreted "zone of
43. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort that,
if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the
courts. Or standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a
statute. But if no comparable common-law right exists and no such
constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available
judicially.
Id. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
44. See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1436-38; Fletcher, supra note 35, at 1456-57. See
generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state law regulating work hours
unconstitutional).
45. See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the
Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1471-78 (1980).
46. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 1496-97. See also Mashaw, supra note 41, at 1129
("statist" conception of legal rights depends on legislative definitions of public welfare for
content); id. at 1131 ("statist" rights structure limits participation).
47. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1676-78 (1975) (arguing that a disavowal of an objective "public interest" and
unguided agency expertise transformed administrative law).
48. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1438-39. Professor Nichol argues that the difference in
what could be considered a cognizable "injury" evolved because legal interests change to
reflect society's values. Today, environmental harms may create judicially recognized
private injuries. To a large extent, such recognition requires empathy by judges. Nichol,
supra note 33, at 89-90.
49. The traditional citation is Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). But for
arguments that Sierra Club did not liberalize standing but imposed restrictions through its
injury in fact requirements, see Mashaw, supra note 41, at 1141, and Jerry W. Markham,
Standing in the Political Arena, 45 ALB. L. REV. 932, 935 (1981).
50. Whether this expansion was initially intended by Congress is debatable. Compare
DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 24.3 (injury in fact was intended test; "within the meaning of the
relevant statute" not to modify "adversely affected") with Scalia, supra note 31, at 887-88
(Congress only codifying existing law); Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1441-42 (APA not
intended to extend standing).
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interest" test,5 ' which could reverse prior holdings affecting who
could enter the courthouse.
The strength of the change is obvious from the "competitor"
cases. Under the earlier private rights view, a competitor could
not challenge actions of the Tennessee Valley Authority, because
there was no "legal interest" in being free from competition.5 2 By
contrast, the Supreme Court later found that competitors of a reg-
ulated entity could be proper parties to protest the activities of the
regulating agency if they show a "plausible relationship" to the
underlying policies of the regulating act.53  The test did not
require proof that Congress had intended to grant a private right
of action to the protesting parties.54 Consequently, the zone of
interest test resulted in a lessening of the burden of proof for
access to court.5 5 To a certain extent, it authorized private attor-
neys general.56
The increased access to the judiciary prompted a more public-
51. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970);
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). See Appendix, infra notes 433-41
and accompanying text.
52. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1937) (rejecting competitor's objection
that loans to another were unauthorized). The Alabama Power Court used an analogy to
the private sphere, namely, whether the owner of a grocery store could object to a
competitor getting a loan because the loan would be ultra vires if the grocer had no
connection with the lending bank. Id. at 481. The Court responded: "Certainly not, unless
we are prepared to lay down the general rule that A, who will suffer damage from the
lawful act of B, and who plainly will have no case against B, may nevertheless invokejudicial aid to restrain a third party, acting without authority, from furnishing means which
will enable B to do what the law permits him to do." Id. While the argument may be
strong when only private interests such as bank's profits are involved, regulation is based on
public interests and thus requires different analysis.
53. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403 (policy was to prevent ills that could accompany a
monopoly). See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1281 (1982) (zone test identifies public values relevant to particular
administrative policy). For examples of other cases granting competitor standing, see
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45
(1970). See also Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 477 (1940) (competitor may be the only one with incentive to uncover violations of
law).
54. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16. Private causes of action require greater threshold
burden, namely, showing plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute were enacted." Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). See also Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (private right of action not
needed for judicial review; APA grants that right and zone of interest test provides a
different threshold). For further information on private rights of action, see Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1289-1316.
55. See Scott, supra note 35, at 663 (use of word "arguably" before "within the zone of
interest of the statute" reduces burden on plaintiff to show Congress' desire to protect;
mere indication that it knew of plaintiff's interest might suffice); Fletcher, supra note 35, at
234-35 (test resembles standard to determine if federal claim exists; only denied if wholly
frivolous or insubstantial).
56. Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 311-12 (1984)
(the authorization occurred because competitive impact was an interest regulators must
recognize).
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oriented view of judicial review57 and of administrative law in
general.5 8  No longer were agencies to be trusted to single-
handedly administer the public interest.59 Congress, in legislating
in complex fields that impacted on many, could rationally expect
that the intended beneficiaries of regulation would have a role in
enforcing the law.60 In addition to the liberal zone of interest test,
courts fostered this citizen role by manipulating the "fairly tracea-
ble" and "redressability" elements of injury in fact.6' However,
manipulation implies an intellectual exercise that may result in an
opposite conclusion.
Several cases illustrate the liberal tendency: a refusal to use
the "fairly traceable" and "capable of redress" requirements to
restrict standing. The most prominent example is United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)."2
In SCRAP, a group of law students objected to railroad rates that
were formulated without an Environmental Impact Statement. 3
For injury, SCRAP claimed its members "suffered economic, rec-
reational and aesthetic harm"6 4 because the freight structure did
57. Referred to as a part of an independent "public law." Sunstein, supra note 35, at
1450. Mashaw's terminology calls it "an individualistic model." Mashaw, supra note 41, at
1131. In the dichotomy of Shapiro, this would be a "democratic" tendency. Shapiro, supra
note 21, at 1497. See also Robert L. Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept of
Rights, 92 YALE L.J. 1174, 1180-88 (1983) (labelled "public interest era"). Cf. Cass R.
Sunstein, Participation, Public Law and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 1001 (1982)
(bipolar orientation of private law venue rules inappropriate for increased representation in
public law litigation); Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (public law litigation differs from bipolar suit for money damages
in numbers of parties affected and type of relief requested).
58. Stewart, supra note 47, at 1670, 1760-62 ("interest representation" model of
administrative law is one in which agencies provide forums to fine-tune legislative actions
rather than merely implementing predetermined statutory goals or being viewed as
uniquely qualified to protect the public interest).
59. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1443 (judicial review changed so as to promote as well as
check regulatory intervention). Rabin, supra note 57, at 1182-83 (judicial review changed
because regulators faced issues of indeterminant harm which needed intangible values
quantified, and many were skeptical about rational implementation of governmental
policy). See generally James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28
ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1976) (detailing rationales for skepticism about agency prowess).
Professor Shapiro concluded that this period, with its loss of faith in expertise, reflected a
distaste for both democracy and technocracy. Judges therefore entered as heroes of the
layperson, creating a partnership with agencies through "hard looks" and added procedural
protection. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 1497-99.
60. Professor Sunstein argues that three premises promoted standing for beneficiaries:
1) Congressional purposes could be defeated not only by overzealous regulation, but by
withholding it; 2) capture made it incongruous to allow regulated access to court, but not
beneficiaries; and 3) statutory rights of beneficiaries were as important as common law
rights. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1443-44.
61. See Appendix, infra text at note 419.
62. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
63. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 679 (1973).
64. Id. at 678. More specifically, in its accepted allegations, SCRAP claimed each
member "'[u]ses the forests, rivers, streams, mountains and other natural resources
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not encourage recycling and would therefore adversely impact the
environment. Despite not only the generalized harm, but also an
"attenuated line of causation,"' ' the Court refused to find that the
facts alleged, if proven, would not place the students among the
injured.66 Moreover, the Court declined to require that an injury
be "significant" and allowed a "trifle" to suffice.6 7
Other cases showed a similar tendency to relax "injury in fact"
to allow a broad-based challenge to a general rule. The Supreme
Court accepted that the Price-Anderson Act,6 which limited lia-
bility in the event of a nuclear accident, could have "caused"
nuclear plants to have been built.69 Therefore, finding the Act
unconstitutional could redress harm caused by the nuclear plant.7 °
In Bryant v. Yellen, 7 1  residents were permitted to question
whether the 160-acre limitation of Reclamation Law applies to
certain private lands in the Imperial Valley. If the limitation
applies, the Secretary of Interior must force the sale of excess acre-
age.72 Because the Valley residents desired to purchase land and
could not do so unless lands were required to be sold below mar-
ket value, the Supreme Court found a particularized injury rather
than a mere generalized desire to enforce the law.7 3 Applying the
limitation to the lands could "redress" their injury. Despite these
liberal cases, the "fairly traceable" causation requirement and the
redressability element provided dual-edged swords.
3. "Causation" Limiting Systemic Relief
There were several cases that were as extreme in denying
surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area and at his legal residence, for camping,
hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes,' and that these
uses have been adversely affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members
breathes the air within the Washington metropolitan area and the area of his legal
residence and that this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate
structure ...." Id.
65. Id. at 688.
66. Id. at 689-90.
67. Id. at 687, 689 n.14.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
69. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978).
70. Id. at 78 (rejecting requirement that plaintiff must negate "speculative and
hypothetical possibilities... to demonstrate the likely effectiveness of judicial relief."). See
also id. at 75 n.20. The liberality of this holding is evident: the injuries alleged in Duke
Power included immediate impact to two lakes and a river. Id. at 73. This led Justice
Stewart to comment, "An interest in the local water temperature does not ... give ...
standing.., to challenge the constitutionality of a law limiting liability in an unrelated and
as-yet-to-occur major nuclear accident." Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
71. 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
72. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366 (1980). The private lands involved were those
with water rights vested in 1929. Id.
73. Id. at 366-68.
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standing as the SCRAP case was in granting it. Many of these cases
dealt with claims that an agency had violated a law in a manner
that injured people in addition to the particular plaintiff.
Although explanations for distinctions between grants and denials
of standing may abound, causation or redressability were the overt
tools used to limit standing.
For example, the Supreme Court presumed that the threat of
criminal prosecution would not necessarily make a father pay
child support.74 The Court also refused to believe that Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) policies on tax deductibility would have the
impact for which they were designed, namely, either promoting
or discouraging certain activities.75
The IRS cases exemplify the difficulties plaintiffs faced when
they sought systemic relief for widely-based problems. In Allen v.
Wright,76 for example, the Supreme Court did not permit a group
of parents to challenge an IRS policy that the parents claimed
allowed private nonprofit schools which discriminated against
African-Americans to retain tax-exempt status.77 According to the
Supreme Court, the injury to the plaintiffs' rights to attend deseg-
regated schools was not "fairly traceable" to the challenged
action.78 Moreover, the Court applied an extra level of analysis
because the activities of third parties in response to the IRS poli-
cies would actually be required for a concrete remedy. No one
could predict whether these third party actions would assist the
plaintiffs. Standing, therefore, could be denied because a
favorable ruling would not redress the harm.79
74. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
75. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984). Allowing a contribution to be tax
deductible lowers the cost of the service provided by the organization receiving the
contribution. A deduction subsidizes and promotes a desired activity. Id. at 785 (Stevens,
J., dissenting), See also Fletcher, supra note 35, at 262.
76. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
77. Allen, 468 U.S. at 739-40. The parents were not challenging a particular school's
status, but were seeking class action status to represent all parents of children in school
systems that were desegregating. Id. at 743. They sought a change in general IRS policy.
Id. at 747.
78. Id. at 758. "The diminished ability ... to receive a desegregated education would
be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there were enough
racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents'
communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in
public-school integration." Id.
79. Id. "[I]t is entirely speculative.., whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any
particular [private] school would lead the school to change its policies .... It is just as
speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a private school would
decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes in educational or
financial policy made by the private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt
status." Id. (citations omitted). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 35-39 (1984) (addressing problem in terms of "remedial standing").
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Similarly, the Supreme Court in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization8 o rejected the argument that IRS
requirements describing the amount of indigent care a hospital
must provide in order to receive tax-exempt status impacted the
plaintiffs' particular injuries, that is, denial of medical services.8 '
To the Court, not only was redressability questionable, but the pol-
icies might not have caused the plaintiffs' specific harms. The
adjective "speculative" tarred the plaintiffs' case.8 2 Both the
redressability and "fairly traceable" elements of injury in fact pre-
cluded relief for particularized injuries caused by general
programs.
The unique problems of seeking systemic relief based on indi-
vidual injury may be solved by careful phrasing of the injury.
Characterizing an injury either broadly or narrowly may manipu-
late the causation and redressability requirements to reach a seem-
ingly sensible result linguistically.83 If the issue is whether a
particular patient will receive medical care or a particular school
child will have a more racially diverse classroom, then revision of a
broad-based national policy might not directly redress that
patient's or child's harm. National policies are, by definition,
designed to affect the collective, not the individual.8 4 However, if
the rights that are denied are more broadly expressed, such as a
right to a desegregated school system unsullied by wrongful chari-
table deductions, then the relationship between the injury and the
challenged action is clearer and less speculative. 5
The technique of manipulating the nature of the injury is illus-
trated in Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation.S6 In this
80. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
81. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976).
82. Id. ("It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the
complaint fairly can be traced to .. . [IRS's] 'encouragement' or instead result from
decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications."). Sometimes, the
Court not only finds that redressability or causation is speculative, but that the happening of
the injury itself is speculative. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S, 95, 105-08 (1983)
(speculative whether plaintiff would be subjected to choke-hold in future); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (speculative whether enforcement of abortion controls
would result in increased patients for pediatrician).
83. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1465-66; Nichol, supra note 33, at 79-82.
84. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1458 (Because regulation is designed to reduce risks that
affect large numbers of people, regulatory beneficiary's injury is not discrete and individual
as is typical at common law, but is "systemic, collective, or probabilistic.").
85. Professor Sunstein suggests that the plaintiffs in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), should have claimed their injury was "the impairment of
the opportunity to obtain medical services under a regime undistorted by unlawful tax
incentives." Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1465. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright
should have claimed "deprivation of an opportunity to undergo desegregation in school
systems unaffected by unlawful tax deductions." Id.
86. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
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case, the state of California claimed that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior did not follow Congress' command to experiment with bid-
ding systems for oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental
Shelf.17 Because California receives a share of revenue from such
leases off its shore, the State had a direct financial stake that cre-
ated an appropriate "distinct and palpable injury" for standing.88
The United States argued, however, that the injury was not
"redressable" by a court order to experiment with bidding sys-
tems, because a court could not compel the use of any specific sys-
tem for leases off California. The Supreme Court assessed the
injury in broader terms:
The essence of California's complaint, however, is
that the Secretary of the Interior, by failing to test non-
cash-bonus systems, has breached a statutory obligation to
determine through experiment which bidding system
works best.
We ... [believe] the Secretary would use the most
successful bidding system on all suitable OCS lease tracts,
including those off the California coast.8 9
Under this more extensive reading, California met standing
requirements. The Supreme Court accepted that the injury would
be redressed by a favorable decision because the Secretary of the
Interior would not refuse to adopt a superior system.90
Why the Supreme Court categorizes injuries in divergent
ways and therefore reaches different conclusions about causation
and redressability can be explained in several ways. One explana-
tion might be that a value judgment on the underlying claims gen-
erated denials of standing.9' A more principled, but sub rosa,
87. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
88. Id. at 161.
89. Id. at 161-62.
90. Id. at 162. Occasionally the Court also broadly characterizes injuries in
constitutional cases. See Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the
plaintiff did not have to prove that but for the challenged affirmative action program, he
would have been admitted to medical school. The injury was "the University's decision not
to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race." Id. at
280 n.14. Cf. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Eighth
Amendment protects not only an individual, but societal interest against barbaric
punishment so that mother of a condemned man has standing in her own right). But see
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1725-26 (1990) (rejecting Marshall's theory).
91. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More than one
commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court's standing inquiry is no
more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying claims. The
Court today does nothing to avoid that criticism."). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968) ("There are at work in the standing doctrine the many subtle pressures which tend
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answer would be that the substantive nature of the claims called
for different treatment.92 For example, SCRAP dealt with an envi-
ronmental problem at the dawn of environmental concern, when
the nation was under the sway of the first Earth Day.93 The
Simon and Allen v. Wright 94 cases, however, involved tax policy,
an area in which Congress provides only limited rights of judicial
review.9 5 Nevertheless, a more important distinction is apparent
from another pattern: the restrictive standing cases more often
occurred when the plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the
statutes or policies than when they were the objects of
regulation.96
4. The Agency Era
Beginning in the mid-1970s, there was a return to a respect
for agency and congressional prerogatives. This provides another
clue to the disparate decisions on standing. Standing is used to
defer to the other branches of government by avoiding judicial
review or by reinforcing the ability of these other branches to
make policy choices.
For example, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc.,97 the Court ultimately upheld a congressional
decision to support the development of nuclear power.98 In
another case the same year, the Court declared:
to cause policy considerations to blend into constitutional limitations."); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority exhibited "an indefensible
hostility to the claim on the merits"). For commentators noting the imposition of valuejudgments or distinctions on merits, see, for example, Nichol, supra note 33, at 80; Logan,
supra note 32, at 70; DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 24:26.
92. See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 24, at 920-22 (distinctions caused by value-neutral
differences such as similarity of challenged action to prosecutorial discretion and the zone
of interests test); Nichol, supra note 33, at 78 (constitutional issues more likely to run into
federalism and separation of powers questions).
93. SCRAP was decided in 1973. Cf. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("These cases are only the beginning
of what promises to become a flood of new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance
in protecting our natural environment."). See Fletcher, supra note 35, at 260 (SCRAP only
discussed injury, but NEPA perhaps demands liberal standing because of type of statutory
right at issue). See Michael A. Perino, Comment, Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental
Law and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135, 144 (1987) (environmental
cases had relaxed standing criteria).
94. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
95. Fletcher, supra note 35, at 262.
96. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1454 n.103 (regulated hospital would have had standing
for review of the IRS policies at issue in Simon). Cf. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Wayne
Township v. Davila, 770 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (school board that must expend
funds has standing).
97. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
98. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See also
42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1988) (Price-Anderson Act limitation on liability).
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Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of
power or it may not. But Congress has made a choice to
at least try nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable
review process in which courts are to play only a limited
role. The fundamental policy questions appropriately
resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not
subject to re-examination in the federal courts under the
guise of judicial review of agency action.99
Therefore, an opinion on the validity of the Price-Anderson Act
was necessary, even if it could be termed an advisory opinion
rather than one generated from a traditional case or contro-
versy."° Standing allowed a congressional policy choice to be
affirmed.
The other more generous grants of standing similarly aided
agency policy choices because the grants upheld agency decisions
that had been invalidated below. The history of agency policy in
Bryant v. Yellen 10 1 is somewhat convoluted. The Department of
Interior had reversed a long-standing position prior to the litiga-
tion. 10 2 The district court found the new Interior policy to be
incorrect, thus confirming the original departmental interpreta-
tion.10 3 The Department of Interior and the Solicitor General
decided not to appeal and re-implemented prior administrative
practice.'0 4 The intervenors then sought standing to appeal on
their own right and prevailed in the court of appeals.'0 5 There-
fore, the only way to return to the position the Department of
Interior now advocated, without the cloud of the Ninth Circuit
decision, was to grant standing to the intervenors.10 6  Standing
99. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978). See also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (fundamental policy choice for nuclear energy
lies with Congress, agencies, and total populace); Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g sub nom., San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(noting Supreme Court's disapproval of D.C. Circuit's interference with nuclear decision
making).
100. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring); DAVIS, supra note 33,
§ 24:33 (justified in Duke because constitutional uncertainties defeated congressional
purpose).
101. 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
102. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 355 (1980). The Department of Interior had
maintained that the 160-acre limitation for irrigation did not apply to pre-existing water
rights in the Imperial Valley. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 365-66.
105. Id. at 366. The court of appeals held that the Reclamation Act limitation was
applicable to the Imperial Valley lands. Id.
106. But see DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 24:33 (unlike Duke, no practical reason
mandating standing in Bryant).
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would allow a ruling on the merits that would confirm the agency
interpretation. 10
7
Examined from the perspective of impact on agency choices,
the post-Warren Court decisions that restrict standing and those
that grant it can be explained as part of a single phenomenon: a
trend away from active review of agency actions.' 0l Courts are
less apt to second-guess an agency or even force it to respond
more fully, because more and more agency decisions are based not
only on scientific evidence that requires complex predictions, 1 9
but also involve statutes in which Congress failed to give direct
guidance on how or even what it wanted implemented." 0 In the
early 1970s, the Supreme Court responded to the latter dilemma
by reading a statute in order to locate the policy choice and thus
create "law to apply," which would enable judicial review."' In
the early 1990s, the Court's response to an unclear statute is to
allow the agency to fill in the blank." 2
The so-called Chevron Doctrine 1 3 cemented this change.
This 1984 case has two important facets. First, the agency is enti-
tled to balance interests when Congress has not. 1 4 The second
107. A similar rationale may explain the Court's desire to grant standing to the State of
California in Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981). Again, the Supreme
Court reversed a decision of the court of appeals, which had invalidated an agency
interpretation of a statute. Id. at 169.
108. Cf. Fallon, supra note 79, at 45 (standing analysis overprotects defendants because
it prevents adjudication as a threshold doctrine rather than deciding a case on the merits).
109. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983) ("When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings
of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential."). See also Antonin
Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L.
REV. 97, 98 (1987) (substantial evidence test used to review factual determinations, but in
complex situations a "court feels less competent to 'second guess' than it would the factual
judgments of a jury."). Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring) (unreliable to have technically illiterate judges substantively review math and
science evidence).
110. Justice Scalia argues that the need for agencies to apply expertise to complex facts
is no longer the main reason for deference to agencies. Deference is appropriate not
because agencies are "experts," but because many decisions do not have one "correct"
answer. They involve policy choices. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517-21. For an examination of this
phenomenon as applied to the Bureau of Land Management, see Maria E. Mansfield, The
"Public" in Public Land Appeals: A Case Study in "Reformed" Administrative Law and
Proposal for Orderly Participation, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 490-99 (1988).
111. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (statute
requires park uses to be given priority).
112. See Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution
Cos., 111 S. Ct. 615 (1991) (upholding discretion of FERC).
113. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2075, 2075 (1990) ("Chevron has altered the distribution of national powers among courts,
Congress, and administrative agencies."). But see Scalia, supra note 110, at 517 (not
necessarily new law but simply provides a background rule giving agencies the primary
interpretive role unless Congress designates differently).
114. The Court explained how indeterminate statutes come about:
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facet is its dogma on judicial review. If Congress has not clearly
spoken on a matter and has either explicitly or implicitly granted
the agency authority to regulate, the role of a court is limited: "[A]
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provi-
sion for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency."' 1
5
The Chevron Doctrine therefore helps to erode judicial
review. It goes beyond mere deference to an agency. Deference
implies the possibility of disagreement, but Chevron gives legisla-
tive effect to agency interpretations.' 6 Although Chevron dealt
with rules promulgated after notice and comment, courts cite it as
precedent for the view that even informal agency pronounce-
ments are binding unless arbitrary or capricious." 7 Consequently,
courts are not actively reviewing agency interpretations of the
statutes they administer. 118
In addition to Chevron's impact on the scope of judicial
review, a tendency to retreat from even implementing judicial
Congress intended to accommodate both interests [economic and
environmental], but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by
these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike
the balance .., thinking that those with great expertise... would be in a better
position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and
perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question,
and... each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
agency.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. Justice Scalia more pragmatically asserts that in most cases Con-
gress probably did not consider either legislating a single result or conferring discretion.
Scalia, supra note 110, at 517.
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Conversely, if Congress has clearly spoken, both the
agency and court are bound; "[they] must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. For further discussion, see infra notes 334-40.
116. Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules With Legislative Effect: An Analysis and
a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 357 (expands agency rules
receiving legislative effect from those for which explicit delegation of rule making exists to
include ones promulgated under implicit authority). Although some question whether the
Doctrine should apply to questions of "pure" statutory construction, Justice Scalia maintains
it should. Scalia, supra note 110, at 512.
117. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (letter
threatening enforcement action without the need for a precancellation hearing). Justice
Scalia maintains Chevron should apply to agency determinations made in the ordinary
course of business, but not to litigation positions. Scalia, supra note 110, at 519-20.
118. For defenses of such deference, see Michael Asimow, Non-Legislative
Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 414-15 (avoids challenges
without persuasive arguments); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 520-25 (1985) (presidential
control is sufficient political accountability); Scalia, supra note 110, 517-18 (Doctrine's
strength is that it allows law to change in light of changed circumstances). For more
tempered defenses, see Sidney Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 869 (if it
requires more complex inquiry into clarity of congressional intent, doctrine not necessarily
bad); Sunstein, supra note 113, at 2076 (Doctrine is plausible reconstruction of Congress'
desires and role of agencies if appropriately limited).
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review is illustrated by Heckler v. Chaney.u 9 This case involved a
challenge to an agency's failure to act and partially reversed Over-
ton Park's °20 presumption that agency action is reviewable. 12 1 At
least in the case of agency inaction, Heckler demands that courts
operate from the presumption that review is not available.
1 22
The insulation of agency determinations from judicial review
mirrors the New Deal attitude. In fact, there has been a techno-
cratic resurgence, a desire for agencies to rationally solve
problems.123 In such situations, judges are not necessarily adept at
review. Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been a similar
return to earlier models of standing.'2 4
B. HISTORY OF RIPENESS LAW AND GENERAL CRITIQUES
As with standing, ripeness law has changed through the years.
The Abbot cases' 25 completed a transformation of a doctrine that
had initially restricted the regulated from obtaining pre-enforce-
ment review. Ripeness jurisprudence, however, differs from
standing law in the sense that it has not been subject to extensive
criticism. Most legal scholars approve of how the doctrine cur-
rently operates,12 6 although some question whether the doctrine,
119. 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (no review of FDA decision not to take enforcement action
against use of lethal drugs for capital punishment). Professor Sunstein identified an earlier
cutback in judicial review; the Court moved from requiring "clear and convincing"
evidence of a congressional intent to preclude review to a requirement that the intent be
"fairly discernible" in Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984). See
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
653, 660 (1985).
120. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
121. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-11 (1971). For a
general discussion of the limited place of unbridled and numinous discretion, see Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 498-
501, 509-10 (1986).
122. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834-35 (1985). For effect of case on lower courts,
see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 118, at 854-56.
123. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 1499-1500. Professor Shapiro argues that high
productivity fueled a contempt for technocracy during the '60s and '70s. Id. Productivity
was not as high in the 1980s. Id. Therefore, people examining Japanese models and
desiring efficiency demanded that agencies not listen to all parties, but learn all facts. Id.
Additionally, Professor Shapiro argues that an intuitive distrust of legislative vetoes could be
traced to the fact that agencies, having been "judicialized" earlier, began to command
more respect. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 462-64
(1988). Congress was viewed as political and arbitrary. Id.
124. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1432-33 (return to private law model); Mashaw, supra
note 41, at 1129-30 (return to the statist model). Professors Shapiro and Glicksman identify
this as part of a general trend towards executive implementation and away from a system of
checks and balances. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 118, at 846-63.
125. Abbot Lab., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n,
387 U.S. 167 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967). See infra notes 450-
65 and accompanying text.
126. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 155
(1987). Cf Brian C. Murchison, On Ripeness and 'Pragmatism' in Administrative Law, 41
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as articulated in the Abbot cases, truly elucidates what is occur-
ring. 127 Before appraising the present status of the doctrine, how-
ever, some history is in order.
Early cases insisted that review was appropriate only when
private parties were directly impacted. For example, no review
was allowed of an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling that
determined how to value railroad property, thus affecting a rail-
road's credit:
The so-called order here complained of is one which does
not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing,
anything; which does not grant or withhold any authority,
privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any
power or facility; which does not subject the carrier to
any liability, civil or criminal; which does not change the
carrier's existing or future status or condition; which does
not determine any right or obligation. 2 "
Unless an agency directly violated a legal duty owed to a plaintiff,
a court would not intervene. 12 9
This approach paralleled a restricted view of standing and was
employed by the justices committed to the New Deal social exper-
iment. These justices only sporadically let courts provide reme-
dies at early stages. Some of the most restrictive opinions
occurred under the tutelage of Justice Frankfurter. 30  In one
egregious example, the Immigration Service construed a statute so
as to make entry from Alaska equivalent to an alien's first entry
into the United States.131 Aliens who seasonally worked in Alaska,
and therefore would have had to choose between employment
and possible exclusion on return, challenged the interpretation.
ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 168 (1989) (since 1967, scholars either simply restate the ripeness
doctrine or call it bad doctrine and seek its demise).
127. Murchison, supra note 126, at 160 ("more of a riddle than a guide, a vocabulary
[rather than] a charter"). For Professor Murchison's elucidation of the riddle, see infra
note 139.
128. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927).
129. Professor Davis argued that the pre-1934 cases resulted from "the longterm lack
of comprehension that severe injury to a plaintiff may be susceptible of remedy by a mere
judicial declaration, and the longterm lack of comprehension that resolving a debilitating
legal uncertainty is a legitimate function of a court." DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 25:2. The
Declaratory Judgments Act, enacted in 1934, changed understandings. Id.
130. See, e.g., Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); International
Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 433
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). See generally DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 25:4 (discussing Frankfurter
philosophy).
131. Boyd, 347 U.S. at 222.
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Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, simply stated that
there was no case or controversy:
This is not a lawsuit to enforce a right; it is an endeavor to
obtain a court's assurance that a statute does not govern
hypothetical situations that may or may not make the
challenged statute applicable. Determinations of the
scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its
immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the
proper exercise of the judicial function.' 3 '
Until an agency has actually acted against a party, the potential
plaintiff would, unfortunately, have to choose between changing
behavior or risking sanctions. Limiting judicial action to enforce-
ment of "rights" echoed the New Deal standing criterion.
Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, the Court recognized
that something less than a direct order to an individual could cause
sufficient harm to allow redress. For example, groups could pro-
test inclusion on a list of "Communist" organizations when an
executive order banned federal employees from joining such
organizations:
It is unrealistic to contend that because the respondents
gave no orders directly to the petitioners to change their
course of conduct, relief cannot be granted against what
the respondents actually did. We long have granted relief
to parties whose legal rights have been violated by unlaw-
ful public action, although such action made no direct
demands upon them.133
The groups received no hearing before the Attorney General
listed them. They lost money and the ability to solicit money, as
well as being subjected to approbation. According to Justice
Frankfurter, these injuries were unusual but similar to others
found justiciable. There was final, immediate harm to
reputation. 34
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence is telling. Despite his many
opinions closing the courthouse door, he emphasized that
132. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
133. Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 141 (1951).
134. Id. at 160 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Although every action by the government
that is defamatory may not be redressable, here the groups were objecting to the validity of
the regulation authorizing the listing, not the specific application of the rule to them. This
issue would be justiciable to Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 159-60.
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"'[f]inality' is not ... a principle inflexibly applied."' 13 5 Crucial
elements to consider include the probability that the plaintiff will
be impacted and the burden created by procedures that exist for
challenging the ultimate action.' 3 6  He concluded as follows:
"Whether 'justiciability' exists, therefore, has most often turned on
evaluating both the appropriateness of the issues for decision by
courts and the hardships of denying judicial relief. ' 137  These
words will resonate later.
In the 1967 Abbot decision,13 8 which is heralded as beginning
the modern era of ripeness, Justice Harlan's formula echoed the
same concerns: "The problem [of ripeness] is best seen in a two-
fold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.' ' 3 9  Pragmatism plainly frames ripeness. 140
Ripeness doctrine can allow other branches of government the
opportunity to work14 ' plus assist the courts in gaining a firmer
factual footing. 142
Because ripeness analysis is sensitive to the substance of any
135. Id. at 156.
136. Id.
137. Id. Frankfurter continued: "This explains... [why] 'standing' to challenge official
action is more apt to exist when that action is not within the scope of official authority than
when the objections to the administrative action goes only to its correctness. The objection
to judicial restraint of an unauthorized exercise of powers is not weighty." Id. at 156-57
(citations omitted). Justice Frankfurter's concern about administrative independence,
therefore, remained intact despite the opening of the courthouse door.
138. Abbot Lab., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
139. Id. at 149. Professor Murchison traces Harlan's pronouncement further, to the
work of Professors Jaffe and Davis. Murchison, supra note 126, at 168-72. The two
professors had fundamental differences:
Davis saw an administrative process whose legitimacy depended in large part on
judicial review. Legitimacy was founded on fairness; judicial doctrine, based on
injury would promote that necessary value. Jaffe . . . saw a process whose
legitimacy depended on the appropriate participation of a cast of players. For
Jaffe, . . . judicial involvement depended on the court's sense of both its own
competence and the agency's need to complete negotiation with all the various
players. In ripeness analysis, these considerations went to the appropriateness of
the issues. Fairness remained a concern for Jaffe, but it was not to govern the
matter.
Id. at 171. Therefore, the distinctions made in the three Abbot cases reflected Professor
Jaffe's concerns. They reveal an approach rather than a doctrine and were "system-sensi-
tive;" the distinctions sought to examine ripeness for judicial intervention from the perspec-
tive of the entire system rather than only considering the Court's own perspective. Id. at
175.
140. Nichol, supra note 126, at 176 ("a malleable tool of judicial decision making"
serving interrelated purposes); DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 25:16 (proper balance between
need to conserve judicial resources and to relieve "debilitating uncertainties").
141. Nichol, supra note 126, at 178.
142. Floyd, supra note 24, at 933 (ripeness resembles causation analysis; "plaintiff
seeking future relief against an alleged illegal statute, regulation or policy must
differentiate" self from general citizenry by showing he or she will likely be impacted). The
controversy must be real and immediate. Id. at 922-34.
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complaint, it could either assist participation by those impacted by
agency action or insulate the agency from such participation. The
Abbot Doctrine, however, has been most helpful to the regulated,
who must alter behavior when new regulations are passed. Judges
have rejected arguments that ripeness concerns would preclude
judicial review of environmental claims, but the analysis in the
environmental setting differs from recognizing the direct "hard-
ship" to the plaintiffs which was evident for the drug companies
involved in the Abbot cases.' 43 The analysis in the environmental
setting has more in common with an equitable irreparable injury
inquiry.
III. THE CASES IN DETAIL: LUJAN AND AIR COURIER
CONFERENCE
A. LUJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
1. Factual and Procedural Background
During the early 1980s, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) was actively revoking withdrawals and terminating land
classifications when it felt these administrative orders no longer
served their original purposes. The BLM-modified orders had pre-
viously rendered the lands affected by them unavailable for the
full array of public land laws. 144 In July of 1985, the National Wild-
life Federation (Federation) filed suit, 1 45 claiming that the BLM
violated the APA, the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)146 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA).147 More specifically, the Federation alleged that the
program under which the BLM acted led the agency to evaluate
the environmental impacts of its actions inadequately and to pro-
vide insufficient public participation in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. The case on the merits has never been completed, although
for several years the BLM could not act freely.
143. See infra notes 451-68 and accompanying text.
144. For background on the withdrawal and classification laws, see National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 307-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also K. Sheldon, NWF v.
Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain the Courts, 20 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10557, 10560-61 (1990); John Treangen, Note, Standing: Closing the Doors of
Judicial Review: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 36 S.D. L. REV. 136, 138-45 (1991)[hereinafter Treangen Note]; Bradley James Larsen, Note, Meeting the Requirements of
Standing: A Framework for Environmental Interest Groups: Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 277, 284-85 (1990) [hereinafter
Larsen Note].
145. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1988).
147. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1784 (1988).
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In late 1985, Judge Pratt found the plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on the merits148 and entered a preliminary injunction
which required the lands to be returned to their status as of Janu-
ary 1, 1981 .14 To a certain extent, this injunction transformed the
district judge into "a defacto Secretary of the Interior" over more
than half of the public lands managed by the BLM. 15 ° Before
many management activities could take place, the BLM had to
turn to the judge for an exception to the injunction.' 5 '
Judge Pratt's preliminary injunction was upheld on appeal, 1 2
but almost three years after he issued it, Judge Pratt found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. 153 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed, both as a new issue and as part of the
"law of the case."' 51 4 It ordered the district court to promptly con-
sider the merits. 55
Instead of proceeding in district court, the Department of
Interior sought certiorari. The Department framed the question
in terms of standing to obtain system-wide relief:
Whether, in a lawsuit challenging a vast array of gov-
ernment decisions affecting the use or disposition of
approximately 180,000,000 acres of public land, an envi-
ronmental organization may establish its standing to sue
by relying on an affidavit asserting that one member of
the organization makes use of property 'in the vicinity' of
a particular 2,000,000 acre parcel, only 4500 acres
148. For land classification terminations, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their
claim that the BLM improperly terminated them without Resource Management Plans.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 676 F. Supp. at 277. For withdrawal revocations, they were likely
to succeed because there was no public participation as required by FLPMA for land
management activities. Id. at 278.
149. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), explicated,
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986).
150. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (as
Amended Dec. 15, 1987) (Williams, J., concurring & dissenting) ("National Wildlife Fed'n
") (identifying affected lands at 280 million acres or almost one-fourth of all federal lands).
151. Id. at 325-26. Even if an exception was not needed, the injunction impacted
managerial operations. During some of this time period, the author was an attorney for the
Department of Interior in the Office of the Regional Solicitor for the Rocky Mountain
Region. Often, before an exchange, lease, or sale could proceed, the BLM required an
opinion from counsel on whether the reinstated classification or withdrawal order
precluded or allowed the proposed activity. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F.
Supp. at 284 (activities permitted on affected public lands under withdrawals or
classifications prior to revocation or termination could take place).
152. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 307.
153. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 329 (D.D.C. 1988).
154. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 430, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
("National Wildlife Fed'n I"). Different judges heard the case in each appeal. The second
decision was characterized as being rendered "somewhat testily." Sheldon, supra note 144,
at 10561.
155. National Wildlife Fed'n II, 878 F.2d at 433.
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of which were affected by one of the challenged
decisions.15 6
The gauntlet was thrown down. As the Supreme Court phrased
the issues, the APA governed the case.15 7 Therefore, the question
was two-fold: 1) whether there was a "final agency action" subject
to review;158 and 2) whether there was a party "suffering legal
wrong... or adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning
of a relevant statute ... ."159 The first issue, with its concern for
"finality" and an identifiable "action," corresponds to some degree
with ripeness doctrine. 160  The second issue concerns the tradi-
tional standing inquiry and will be addressed first.
2. The "Injury in Fact" Decision
In order to have standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury in
fact and be among the injured.' 6' The National Wildlife Federa-
tion claimed an injury to the environmental and aesthetic interests
of its members. 6 2 It also alleged that it was injured as an organiza-
tion because the BLM's failure to provide information and public
participation interfered with the Federation's purposes, which
include participating in decisionm aking. 16 3 These types of injuries
are cognizable. 164 The primary issue in the case was whether Fed-
eration members were "among the injured." A second question
involved the scope of the action challenged.
The Federation sought to challenge what it referred to as the
"Land Withdrawal Review Program,"165 which was a policy
encompassed in several agency directives. 166 By the time of suit,
156. Peition for cert., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(No. 88-5397, 88-5291), referred to as presenting "a tantalizing question" to the
conservative Court. Sheldon, supra note 144, at 10562.
157. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3185 (1990) (APA rules because
neither NEPA nor FLPMA provide a private right of action)
158. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (final agency action made reviewable by statute;
there is no other adequate remedy in court for final agency action) and discussion of APA,
infra notes 435-44.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). See also Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186.
160. It is also, to some degree, reminiscent of the Supreme Court's insistence on a
concrete "proposal" to trigger NEPA. Compare Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 401
(1976) (need actual proposal or there is nothing for analysis) with Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190
(desire to "'flesh out" controversy).
161. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). See infra notes 414-22 and
accompanying text.
162. National Wildlife Fed'n I, 835 F.2d at 312-13.
163. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.D.C. 1988).
164. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977) (general requirements of organizational standing).
165. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 309.
166. See, e.g., BLM Organic Act Directive No. 81-11, June 18, 1981. For more detail,
see Treangen Note, supra note 144, at 157-58 and Larsen Note, supra note 144, at 284-85.
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at least 788 classifications had been terminated or withdrawals
revoked.167 Each of these actions was done by a Public Land
Order (PLO) or other notice published in the Federal Register.'
In addition to alleging injuries to the organization, the Federation
concentrated on two particular localities in order to attack the pro-
gram. These were the South Pass-Green Mountain area in Wyo-
ming and the Grand Canyon National Park-Arizona Strip area.
The Federation filed affidavits of two members which stated that
the member used land "in the vicinity" of one of these locales. 169
The court of appeals in 1987 was the first court to use these
affidavits in analyzing whether an injury in fact was shown. 170
Before addressing the affidavits, however, it noted that the allega-
tions of the complaint alone would suffice to survive a motion to
dismiss under SCRAP. 7 ' The complaint referred to specific land
by reference to identified actions published in the Federal Regis-
ter and therefore alleged use of affected lands. 172 Furthermore,
the affidavits would have cured any problem created by lack of
specificity in the complaint about what lands were used. The
court expressly rejected the idea that standing would be negated
by using the words "in the vicinity" when referring to the lands
covered by the challenged withdrawal revocations. 173 Moreover,
the court was unconcerned about the "fairly traceable" and
"redressability" requirements. Injury was not dependent on addi-
tional actions by third parties, because the agency action directly
impacted lands.174
When Judge Pratt looked at these affidavits in response to a
motion for summary judgment, he disagreed with this assessment
of the injury and focused on "whether the plaintiff's [use of lands]
will occur in the same location as the third party's response to the
167. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 312.
168. Id. at 307-09, 313.
169. Referred to as the Erman and Peterson affidavits. See, e.g., National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1988).
170. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 313.
171. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
172. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 312-13 ("It alleges that its 4.5 million
members and supporters across the country use and wish to continue to use previously
withdrawn or classified lands for recreational or aesthetic purposes, and that these persons
are injured in fact when withdrawals are revoked and classifications terminated, thereby
threatening continued use of the property and its resources for such purposes.").
173. Id. at 313. Compare language in Lujan dealing with use of lands "in the vicinity"
with allegations in SCRAP, quoted supra note 64.
174. Id. at 314 ("[B]ecause the [Withdrawal Review] Program acts directly on the land
(rather than on third parties), we can be certain that the challenged agency action has
affected the land areas that the Federation's members use and that the anticipated response
by third parties will concern those lands.").
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challenged governmental action."' 5  Judge Pratt seemingly
treated the injury as requiring something in addition to the gov-
ernmental action of opening lands to be complete. Whether activ-
ities no longer forbidden might take place and thus interfere with
the members' enjoyment of public lands was of primary concern.
Judge Pratt therefore examined the affidavits carefully. The
Peterson Affidavit claimed that she used land "in the vicinity"'
76
of the South Pass-Green Mountain area. The court noted the area
was large, and the impacts of opening the lands to mineral activity
would be relatively localized.' 77 The classification termination
would allow mining on 4,500 acres, but the relevant area com-
prised two million acres, the balance of which, except for two
thousand acres, had always been open to mineral leasing and min-
ing. 178  The Erman Affidavit similarly referred to using federal
lands in the vicinity of the affected public lands which, in the
Grand Canyon-Arizona Strip area, comprised more than 5.5 mil-
lion acres. '7 9
Because of these facts, Judge Pratt rejected standing based on
injury to specific members. To him, the proof was inadequate not
only for the individual actions mentioned in the affidavits, but also
for the entire program:
Both the Peterson and Erman Affidavits are vague,
conclusory and lack factual specificity. They do not and
cannot show 'injury in fact' with respect to the two spe-
cific areas in Wyoming and Arizona in the vicinity of
which these afflants claim to be located. More important,
standing alone, these two affidavits do not provide any
basis for standing to challenge, as violative of the Federal
Land Policy Management Act, the legality of each of the
1250 or so individual classification terminations and with-
drawal revocations. It should be noted that plaintiff's
claims of injury reach hundreds of decisions affecting 180
million acres spread over seventeen states.' S0
No injury in fact existed for the members. Judge Pratt also found
the affidavit of the president of the Federation, submitted to sup-
175. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoting
The Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Griles dealt with the
difficulty of proving use of submerged lands.
176. Id. at 331.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 332.
180. National Wildlife Fed'n, 699 F. Supp. at 332.
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port organizational standing, to be similarly "conclusory."''
On appeal, the Distrtict of Columbia Circuit found that the
affidavits did show "injury in fact." Its decision was partially based
on the law of the case.18 2 However, the court also insisted that the
affidavits be read as sufficiently "specific" because to not do so
would make them meaningless. 18 3  At a minimum, the affidavits
should be considered "ambiguous," and doubts resolved in favor of
the non-moving party, that is, the Federation.8 4
The Supreme Court reviewed the same affidavits to ascertain
if "injury in fact" was shown. It easily found that the type of injury
alleged, namely environmental and aesthetic harm, could be cog-
nizable, but questioned whether the affidavits, demonstrated that
such interests of the two members were affected.18 5 Under the
Court's reading, the affidavits did not prove such injury: the "aver-
ments . . . state only that one of respondent's members uses
unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some por-
tions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will occur
by virtue of the governmental action."'18
In this portion of the decision, the Supreme Court emphasized
the procedural status of the case. This was not a Rule 12(b) motion
to dismiss, but a summary judgment proceeding. Although doubts
must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party in this setting,
the court of appeals inappropriately relied on this doctrine. The
decisional rule is applicable only when there is a conflict between
181. Id. at 330.
182. See National Wildlife Fed'n II, 878 F.2d at 432-33. In National Wildlife Fed'n I,
the second panel discussed the earlier ruling on the sufficiency of the affidavits and
acknowledged that the previous setting involved a motion to dismiss, which has a lower
burden for plaintiffs than summary judgment. Id. But the court recognized that the prior
judgment also found the injury sufficient for a preliminary injunction, which requires a
standard similar to that sustaining standing on a summary judgment. Id. See also National
Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 329-30 (Williams, J., concurring & dissenting) (standing to
support preliminary injunction similar to that for summary judgment and "minimally
met").
183. The affidavits were only challenged for their specificity, not their truthfulness:
If Peterson was not referring to lands in this 4500-acre affected area, her
allegation of impairment to her use and enjoyment would be meaningless, or
perjurious. The District Court in no way questions the veracity or clarity of the
affidavit, only its specificity .... [U]nless Peterson's language is read to refer to
the lands affected by the Program, the affidavit is, at best, a meaningless
document.
National Wildlife Fed'n II, 878 F.2d at 431 (citation omitted).
184. Id. The court of appeals also felt that the district court should consider the
supplemental affidavits submitted by the Sierra Club, which were, without question,
sufficiently specific.
185. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187 (1990).
186. Id. at 3189.
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averred facts.18 7 In the current case, the affidavits did not aver
any specific facts, and a court could not "presume" facts necessary
for standing.' a
To the Court, the affidavits of individual members proved no
injury in fact to challenge anything, be it a single PLO or a com-
plete "Land Withdrawal Review Program."189 Justice Scalia
found the affidavit in support of organizational standing similarly
flawed.' 90 To solve these problems, however, would only require
more specificity in pleading or better searching out of members
who actually used the particularly affected lands. If the decision
stopped at this point, there would be little reason to write this
article.
3. The Nature of an "Action" and the "Ripeness" Decision
Justice Scalia, however, additionally discussed what consti-
tuted agency action and what issue would be "ripe" to chal-
lenge. 19' Two concepts are important to this portion of the
decision and should be recognized as separate points: 1) the Fed-
eration attacked the BLM's "Land Withdrawal Review Program"
and, to do so, 2) the Federation detailed certain Public Land
Orders and classification decisions to which it objected. These par-
ticular actions had modified earlier decisions and would allow min-
eral activity on affected lands. According to the Federation, the
187. Id. at 3188 (only applicable "where the facts specifically averred by that party
contradict facts specifically averred by the movant").
188. Id. at 3189 ("It will not do not to 'presume' the missing facts because without
them the affidavits would not establish the injury that they generally allege."). When faced
with a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more than is required to survive a
Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. SCRAP was therefore
inapposite. Justice Scalia also noted that the SCRAP decision has "never since been
emulated by this Court." Id. While not overruling SCRAP, he is trying to undercut its
importance. See also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1725 (1990) (SCRAP at outer
limits of standing).
189. For an argument that the Court misinterpreted the "in the vicinity" language, see
Treangen Note, supra note 144, at 153-55 (words used to avoid implication that plaintiffs
were at the bottom of a pass or top of a mountain).
190. In fact, it was worse in Justice Scalia's estimation because, unlike the Erman and
Peterson affidavits, the affidavit of the Federation's president did not contain geographical
descriptions sufficient to even identify a particular classification decision as the source of the
problem. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3194.
191. Ostensibly, these issues had to be addressed because other submitted affidavits
were more specific than the rejected ones. Id. at 3189. In fact, the government admitted
these supplemental affidavits were not facially deficient, although it reserved the right to
attack the truth of their allegations. Id. at 3196 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia, however, held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
admit these affidavits. Id. at 3193. Justice Blackmun therefore correctly labelled this
portion of the majority opinion as "abstract" because the majority removed the predicate of
needing to rule on the supplemental affidavits. Additionally, much of the discussion could
be described as going to the scope of relief, not the question of standing. Id. at 3201
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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authorization would injure its members. Justice Scalia questioned
whether the operative element of the first concept, the so-called
"program," was a "final agency action" and whether the actions
delineated in the second were "ripe" for review.
On the first issue-the scope of the challenged action-the
court of appeals viewed the lawsuit as involving the total Land
Withdrawal Review Program. The court affirmed a preliminary
injunction that undid every individual BLM action taken since
1981 under the existent policy. Because the Federation chal-
lenged "an alleged pattern of agency conduct,"' 92 the court did
not require it to prove "injury" in regard to each specific tract of
land:
If the organization can establish that the Department's
actions as to one parcel of land are unlawful because the
procedure by which the agency terminates classifications
and revokes withdrawals fails to comply with FLPMA,
then it has established the illegality as to all the lands at
issue which have been affected by the unlawful
procedure.
93
The common theme in each action would justify system-wide
relief.
The court of appeals also resolved the second issue in favor of
the plaintiffs. It recognized an immediate impact from the BLM
revocations and terminations because the BLM was not merely
authorizing third party activities that could impact the lands. To
the court, the BLM actions revoking withdrawals and terminating
classifications directly affected lands.' 9 4 Moreover, these program
activities could create irreparable injury for the plaintiffs.' 95
Changes in land ownership could occur.' 96 Mineral development
also might be imminent. 197 To the court of appeals, it was imma-
terial that the BLM retained discretion on whether or not it would
allow some future uses; the thrust of the suit was to limit such dis-
192. National Wildlife Fedn 1, 835 F.2d at 314.
193. Id. See also National Wildlife Fed'n 11, 878 F.2d at 431 n.12.
194. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 314 ("[B]ecause the Program acts directly
on the land (rather than on third parties), we can be certain that the challenged agency
action has affected the land areas that the Federation's members use ... .
195. Id. at 324-26.
196. These changes could occur either from patenting under the Mining Law of 1872,
30 U.S.C. § 21 (1988), or through land sales and exchanges. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1716 (1988).
197. National Wildlife Fed'n 1, 835 F.2d at 324-25. Under the Mining Law of 1872,
mining could begin without government approval. The opening of the lands for mineral
leasing could also create immediate impacts. Seven thousand mining claims had been
located and 1,000 mineral leases issued on lands previously closed to mining or mineral
leasing.
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cretion until the proper procedures had been followed.1 98 There-
fore, the court's conclusions were tantamount to a finding that the
propriety of both the program and the individual orders were suffi-
ciently "ripe" for review.
Justice Scalia had more difficulty characterizing the lawsuit in
this manner. He refused to acknowledge that the Land With-
drawal Review Program was either an "agency action" or "final
agency action" subject to review:
The term 'land withdrawal review program' (which as far
as we know is not derived from any authoritative text)
does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or
even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders
and regulations. It is simply the name by which [the BLM
has] occasionally referred to in the continuing (and thus
constantly changing) operations of the BLM in reviewing
withdrawal revocation applications and the classifications
of public lands and developing the land use plans as
required by the FLPMA.'99
According to Justice Scalia, generic agency activity cannot be
reviewed without identifying a particular regulation or order that
has across-the-board applicability." If one is identified, then a
finding of illegality in one instance may impact the "whole pro-
gram." To a certain degree, Justice Scalia's argument is a matter
of semantics, because the same end result is possible as under the
court of appeals reading.2 0 1
On another level, however, there is a substantive difference
between the approach of the court of appeals and Justice Scalia.
198. Id. at 325. The prior status in most instances ensured the lands withdrawn or
classified would remain in federal ownership.
199. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990). Other language
was as follows: "no more an identifiable 'agency action'-much less a 'final agency action'-
than a 'weapons procurement program' of the Department of Defense or a 'drug
interdiction program' of the Drug Enforcement Administration." Id.
200. The Court explained:
If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular
measure across-the-board to all individual classification terminations and
withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final, and has become
ripe for review in the manner we discuss subsequently in the text, it can of
course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected--and the
entire 'land withdrawal review program,' insofar as the content of that particular
action is concerned, would thereby be affected.
Id. at 3190 n.2.
201. Justice Scalia, however, insists on the distinction, maintaining that to recognize a
lawsuit's general impact differs from "permitting a generic challenge, to all aspects of the
'land withdrawal review program,' as though that itself constituted a final agency action."
Id.
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Most obviously, the court of appeals recognized a "pattern of con-
duct" as being a sufficient "across-the-board" requirement to trig-
ger review.20 2 No specifically designated "regulation" or "order"
was necessary to comprise an "action" in its view. More impor-
tantly, Justice Scalia maintains that even if a regulation satisfying
the agency action prerequisite is found to exist, review will be
dependent on ripeness considerations unless a statute specifically
calls for review of broad regulations. 0 3 To Scalia, judicial review
must be deferred until a concrete action is taken which would
apply the regulation in a manner that would harm or threaten
harm to the Federation. He justified waiting as a method of reduc-
ing the controversy's scope to manageable proportions and flesh-
ing out its factual components.20 4
The need for a concrete act, which is essentially a "ripeness"
requirement, may not be an easy test for beneficiaries of agency
action to meet.20 5 Justice Scalia looked at the ripeness of what was
admittedly a rule, namely, an individual Public Land Order.20 6
The Supreme Court seems to say that a PLO simply announces
how the BLM will manage the land in the future: "It may well be,
then, that even those individual actions will not be ripe for chal-
lenge until some further agency action or inaction more immedi-
ately harming the plaintiff occurs. ' 2 7 Justice Scalia, therefore,
ignores the immediacy of harm that the court of appeals recog-
nized. Indeed, Justice Scalia emphasized the regulations that
require the BLM to approve a mine plan in certain circum-
202. Justice Blackmun was not certain whether a system-wide violation existed: "The
real issue is whether the actions and omission that NWF contends are illegal are themselves
part of a plan or policy." Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For an
argument that a well-defined policy existed, see Treangen Note, supra note 144, at 157-58.
203. Lujan, 100 S. Ct. at 3190.
204. Id.
205. The regulated will have an easier time: "The major exception [to awaiting
concrete harm to review a rule]... is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires
the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately." Id.
206. Id. (PLO is a "rule" under APA because it has "'general or particular
applicability and future effect'....").
207. Id. This ruling may be the "silver lining" for environmentalists, allowing them to
attack the propriety of a withdrawal or its revocation at a much later date than previously
allowed. Sheldon, supra note 144, at 10565. Other precedent began the statute of
limitations at the date of the PLO itself. Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 906
F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Mesa Operating Ltd. v. United States, 931 F.2d
318, 323 n.30 (5th Cir. 1991) (cannot challenge rule itself if statute of limitations has run,
despite timely challenge of rule's application); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315
(9th Cir. 1988) (six year statute applies to regularity of rule's promulgation). But see Wind
River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1991) (substantive
challenge to agency decision alleging lack of agency authority may be brought within six
years of application of decision).
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stances.20 8 Deferring analysis until this stage might make review
more concrete because the extent of any proposed activity will be
known, 20 9 but it ignores the private rights that the Mining Law of
1872 grants.2 10
Lujan, however, requires plaintiffs to delineate harm that is
both specific and immediate. The dual requirements may make it
difficult for those seeking system-wide relief, namely, assuring
"across-the-board protection" 211 of wildlife and natural resources.
Justice Scalia's discussion, even if "abstract" and not germane to
the decision, indicates a further entrenchment of the private
rights model of standing and ripeness. It reflects his deep-rooted
belief in the nature of the judicial role and the requirements of
separation of powers. 21 2
B. AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA V. POSTAL
WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO
1. Factual and Procedural Background
In Lujan, the Court briefly explained that the APA requires a
plaintiff to have "suffered legal wrong" because of the challenged
action or to have been "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the
action "within the meaning of the relevant statute. '21 3 In Lujan,
the Supreme Court found the "zone of interest" test posed no bar-
rier; the environmental interests claimed were exactly the type of
interests both NEPA and FLPMA were to protect.21 4 Neverthe-
less, the Court offered an example of when the test would not be
met:
208. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190-91 n.3 (agency action ripe for review will occur if permit
granted).
209. As Justice Scalia notes: "[B]efore the grant of such a permit, or (when it will
suffice) the filing of a notice to engage in mining activities, or (when only 'negligible
disturbance' will occur) actual mining of the land, it is impossible to tell whether mining
activities will occur." Id.
210. Under current understanding, an irretrievable commitment occurs when a
mining claim is initiated. As Ms. Sheldon notes, Justice Scalia certainly "knows better" than
his footnote implying that the BLM could stop development later because he was involved
in Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (oil and gas lease authorizes
development). See Sheldon, supra note 144, at 10564. Additionally, postponing a suit
pending future action may subject a plaintiff to a laches defense, a tactic tried in Lujan. See
Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3202 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3191.
212. Id. See infra notes 263-76 and accompanying text. See also Jonathon Poisner,
Environmental Values and Judicial Review After Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of
Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335, 348-50 (1991) (separation of powers
analysis explains requirement of proof of injury as opposed to Warren Court's acceptance of
plausible allegation of injury).
213. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186 (quoting § 702 of the APA).
214. Id. at 3187.
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[T]he failure- of an agency to comply with a statutory pro-
vision requiring "on the record" hearings would assuredly
have an adverse effect upon the company that has the
contract to record and transcribe the agency's proceed-
ings; but since the provision was obviously enacted to pro-
tect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not
those of the reporters, that company would not be
"adversely affected within the meaning" of the statute. 15
In Air Courier, the Supreme Court found an opportunity to give
flesh to this hypothetical. 16
The plaintiff in Air Courier was a union representing postal
workers. The union objected when the Postal Service approved
an exception to the Private Express Statutes (PES)217 for "interna-
tional remailing."21 Under the PES, exceptions to the Postal Ser-
vice monopoly are only available where the "public interest
requires the suspension. 2 1 9 The union claimed the rulemaking
did not support such a finding. The district court disagreed, grant-
ing a summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service. 22 ° The
Fifth Circuit reversed. 2
To reverse the district court and reach the merits, the court of
appeals found the postal unions had standing. To the court, the
unions' interests fell within the zone of interest of the PES for two
reasons. First, the PES had been reenacted as part of the larger
Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), which includes provisions deal-
ing with labor. Because the PES is the "linchpin" of a financially
215. Id. at 3186. For a comparison to the Court's example, see Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir.
1988), in which Judge Williams offers an example of a party not entitled to standing: "If
Congress authorized bank regulators to mandate physical security measures for banks... a
shoal of security service firms might enjoy a profit potential.... But in the absence of either
some explicit evidence of an intent to benefit such firms, or some reason to believe that such
firms should be unusually suitable champions of Congress's ultimate goals, no one would
suppose them to have standing to attack regulatory laxity."
216. Hence, compounding a hypothetical by using a hypothetical to resolve the
question.
217. 18 U.S.C. 1693-1699 (1988); 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1988).
218. The history of the controversy is as follows. Air Couriers Conference of America
relied on the exception for "urgent letters" to provide "international remailing," that is,
taking letters abroad to be mailed in another country's system. The Postal Service thought
this was an inappropriate use of the "urgent letter" exception. It therefore promulgated a
rule for a separate PES suspension for "international remailing." Air Courier Conference of
America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S. Ct. 913, 915-16 (1991).
219. 39 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1988).
220. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 701 F.
Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1988). Air Courier Conference, an entity that used the exception, had
joined the lawsuit aligned with the Postal Service.
221. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 891
F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (regulation arbitrary and capricious because it only considered
costs to users).
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viable postal service, it was related to the interests of the unions
expressed in other sections of the Postal Reorganization Act.222
Additionally, without looking beyond the PES to the larger Act,
the PES and the unions' concerns were connected: "the revenue
protective purposes of the PES, standing alone, plausibly relate to
the Unions' interest in preventing the reduction of employment
opportunities."2 23 Quite logically, the court of appeals concluded
"postal workers benefit from the PES's function in ensuring [the
Postal Service with] a sufficient revenue base. '22 4 The Supreme
Court would not agree that this interest would grant standing to
challenge a purported violation of the PES.
2. The "Zone of Interest" Test
For the first time, the Supreme Court found a plaintiff beyond
the zone of interest of a relevant statute. 2 5 It characterized the
postal workers' unions as analogous to the court reporters
imagined in Lujan.22 a They had the injury in fact required by sec-
tion 702 of the APA,227 but the harm suffered was not within "the
meaning of the relevant statute." Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, rejected both rationales the court of appeals used to
justify including the unions within the Act's "zone of interest."228
First, Justice Rehnquist criticized the court of appeals for
holding that the revenue protection purposes of PES relate to
interests the unions have in preserving job opportunities. He
found that the circuit's analysis "conflates the zone-of-interests test
with injury in fact."'2 29  The loss of economic opportunity may
injure the unions' members as the court reporters in the hypothet-
ical were injured, but Justice Rehnquist insisted on examining the
statute involved to see if Congress intended to protect jobs. As
stated in Lujan, the relevant statute is "the statute whose violation
222. Id. at 310.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. In Community Nutrition Institute, milk consumers were "within the zone" of the
relevant statute. Judicial review at their behest, however, was precluded by detailed
statutory provisions granting named parties specific remedies. Block v. Community
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346-48 (1984).
226. See supra text at note 215.
227. Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913, 918
(1991) (district court found injury in fact and finding not appealed).
228. Id. at 918, 921.
229. Id. at 918. Cf Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 765 F.2d
1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (then-Judge Scalia's complaint that the D.C.
Circuit was collapsing the zone of interest test into the injury in fact determination), aff'd
sub nom. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
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is the gravamen of the complaint."23 ° According to Justice Rehn-
quist, neither the basic wording of the PES nor its legislative his-
tory reveals a Congressional intent to protect this interest: "The
postal monopoly .. .exists to ensure that postal services will be
provided to the citizenry at large, and not to secure employment
for postal workers."231
Second, the Supreme Court disagreed about whether a court
should go beyond the PES and examine the intent of the Postal
Reorganization Act in its entirety. Justice Rehnquist acknowl-
edged that previous cases considered other sections of a larger act
of which the statute under which the case was brought was a part,
but those cases were distinguished.23 2 In Clarke,233 the specific
provision at issue was an exception to the main rule embodied in
the remainder of the Act. Hence, the policies behind the other
portions of the Act were relevant to understanding the provision
allegedly violated. 234 The challenged statute and larger act did
not have this relationship in Air Courier:
The only relationship between the PES, upon which the
Union rely for their claim on the merits, and the labor-
management provisions of the PRA, upon which the
Unions rely for their standing, is that both were included
in the general codification of postal statutes embraced in
the PRA. . . . To adopt petitioners' contention would
require us to hold that the 'relevant statute' in this case is
the PRA, with all of its various provisions united only by
the fact that they deal with the Postal Service. But to
accept this level of generality in defining the 'relevant
statute' could deprive the zone-of-interests test of virtu-
ally all meaning.235
The Supreme Court found no connection between the two parts of
the code.236
The Supreme Court did not have to read the statutes as nar-
230. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187 (1990).
231. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 920.
232. Id. (distinguishing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); and Investment
Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)).
233. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 918-19.
234. Id. at 920.
235. Id. at 921. Cf. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 765 F.2d
1196, 1196 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (standing under one act not sufficient to raise questions
about another statute), aff'd sub nor. Clark v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
236. Cf. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 765 F.2d at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (competitors
bringing suit no more within zone protected by statute than are "businesses competing for
the parking spaces that an unlawful [banking] branch may occupy.").
[Vol. 68:1
STANDING AND RIPENESS REVISITED
rowly as it did. The postal workers, being a part of the Postal Ser-
vice, have a greater relationship to it than court reporters have to
the general public who are granted rights under a statute requir-
ing a hearing on the record. The workers are, in the words of
Clarke, more than "marginally related" to the purposes of the stat-
ute because an economically viable Post Office is a prerequisite for
their employment.
If postal workers could not sue, it is questionable whether any-
one could challenge the Postal Service determination at issue
under the Court's view. The public is not envisioned as a check on
executive action. The zone of interest test in Air Courier requires
a clear indication from Congress that a particular party is to be
allowed to bring suit.2 37
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL PEDIGREES OF THE DECISIONS
Several strains of thought are evident in the two decisions.
One, made explicit in Lujan, is that standing and ripeness doctrine
can promote a formal, compartmentalized separation of powers
agenda.238 Although this is not a new position, Justice Scalia's con-
centration on the APA's provisions has contracted ripeness and
standing into one analysis. Moreover, the concerns expressed may
implicate sovereign immunity and nondelegation theories as well
as separation of powers.
A second major theme present is the philosophy that gener-
ally "bystanders" should not have standing. Close examination of
congressional intent under a revitalized "zone of interest" test will
restrict standing to those who are either the regulated or the pri-
mary beneficiaries of a regulatory statute. Although not making
those with standing coterminous with those "especially benefit-
ted" by a statute, as required for a private cause of action, standing
requirements have tightened.
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A DECISIONAL GUIDE
Although the standing decisions analyzed draw upon the idea
of separation of powers, this concept itself is not a model of clarity
237. Cf. Mary Christine Hutton, The Unique Perspective of Justice White: Separation
of Powers, Standing and Section 1983 Cases, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 404 (1988).
238. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190 (1990). In response to
allegations of "rampant" violations of law in the program, the Court stated: "Perhaps [it is]
so. But respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree,
rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic
improvements are normally made." Id.
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as a doctrine.2 39 To begin with, the United States Constitution
does not even mention "separation of powers," but merely deline-
ates three separate federal branches of government that share ulti-
mate power. Many identify the concept as a "bulwark against
tyranny, "240 which prevents any one branch of government from
exercising power to the extent that it could threaten freedom. 4 1
To describe its purpose, however, is not necessarily a description
of how separation of powers should operate.
There are two models of separation of powers analysis: the
formal and the functional. 42 The formal views each branch as
tightly confined to its enumerated powers. The functional
approach stresses core functions-relationships between the
branches may be flexible if these core functions are not
threatened.24 3 Under the functional view, the branches may over-
lap and create checks and balances.244 With the growth of admin-
istrative agencies, the functional theory may be more appropriate
than the traditional formal theory of three compartmentalized
branches.245 Nevertheless, the formal theory appears to be the
philosophy forwarded in these cases.246
The formal approach begins with the Court's constitutional
role. The judiciary is empowered to decide various enumerated
"cases" and "controversies. '247 To some, this means that standing
and other justiciability doctrines should preclude a court decision
that did not arise in what would have been a "judicial" setting at
239. In fact, it may not be a doctrine but merely a theory, one which provides only a
"framework" for analysis rather than strict rules. Arthur S. Miller, Separation of Powers:
An Ancient Doctrine Under Modern Challenge, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 299 (1976).
240. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
241. See, e.g., Ralph F. Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N.C. L. REV.
183, 194 (1940); Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
371 (1976). The Massachusetts constitution expressly states that the purpose of separation
of powers is to avoid despotism. Scalia, supra note 31, at 881. But see Miller, supra note
239, at 302 (separation also promotes efficiency).
242. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).
243. Id.
244. Hutton, supra note 237, at 389-95 (creating a flexible government that may
respond to change).
245. Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578-79 (1984) (formal three branch theory as
traditionally expressed cannot describe our government; model should look to separation of
functions and checks and balances with agencies as inferior parts of government controlled
by the other three).
246. Cf. Strauss, supra note 242, at 626-28 (siren call of certainty influenced cases
decided in 1982-83); Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting The Constitutional Status of
Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 291-92 (1987) (noting formalism in
separation of powers decisions).
247. U.S. CONST. art. III, 2. The cases enumerated include those arising under the
Constitution or federal laws and maritime issues. "Controversies" listed include those in
which the United States is a party or between citizens of different states.
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the time of the Constitution. 24  From a slightly different perspec-
tive, the formal approach identifies the assigned function of courts
to be deciding individual rights in particularized settings. Stand-
ing and ripeness are designed to keep courts in this assigned
realm. Justice Scalia, in Lujan, aligns with this belief and uses the
doctrines to prevent what he would term governance by the judi-
ciary.249 This position is not unique to Scalia, but is opposed by a
different view in which members of the public are given standing
because they are proper "checks" on the executive. 50
Despite the current views of Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court has not uniformly viewed standing as linked inexorably to
separation of powers. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Sierra Club
v. Morton,2 5 ' objected to the Solicitor General's attempt to raise
the specter of "government by the Judiciary" when examining
standing.25 2 To Justice Douglas, natural resources could too easily
be tramelled because agencies tend to be captured and have such
broad authority to act in the "public interest. '25 3 Therefore, the
problem was not one of judicial interference, but one of assuring
that nature not be destroyed before being considered. Allowing
standing furthers this end: "existing beneficiaries of these environ-
mental wonders should be heard."2 54
On a less emotional and issue-sensitive level, Chief Justice
Warren wrote for the Court in Flast v. Cohen 2 55 of the need to
distinguish standing from other issues of justiciability. Because
standing concentrates on the "who," it would not implicate sepa-
ration of powers:
248. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (no standing "unless the nature of the action challenged, the
kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial
determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial
courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed."). To some, this
historically-phrased limitation would force courts to eschew advisory opinions and only act
at the behest of a person concretely injured. The historical evidence, however, does not
support this view. Courts could intervene in other situations through informer and relator
suits and mandamus actions. See Winter, supra note 28, at 1394-1417. See also DAVIS,
supra note 33, at § 24.5 (advisory opinions given at time of Constitution).
249. Justice Scalia had espoused this view previously in his scholarly writing. See, e.g.,
Scalia, supra note 31. For a comparison of Justice Scalia's scholarly work and his judicial
output as an appellate judge, see Perino, supra note 93, at 156-72.
250. Hutton, supra note 237, at 387 (view identified as being that of Justice White).
251. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 745. See id. at 753 (Appendix to Opinion of Douglas, J., Dissenting, Extract
from Oral Argument of the Solicitor General (Griswold)) (arguing that courts cannot simply
answer legal questions at behest of the interested, because each branch of government has
specified powers and balances); id. at 755 (plaintiff's solution lies with Congress because it
could stop the development).
253. Id. at 745-51.
254. Id. at 750.
255. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive
issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated. Thus, in
terms of Article III limitation of federal court jurisdiction,
the question of standing is related only to whether the dis-
pute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution.256
Other doctrines of justiciability, such as the political question doc-
trine,257 address substantive issues that could broach the separa-
tion of powers problem. In 1984, most of the Justices who would
later dissent in Lujan endorsed this view." 8
These reaffirmations of Flast v. Cohen, however, came in dis-
senting opinions after the Warren Court era ended.259 Justice
O'Connor wrote for the majority in the Allen v. Wright2 60 deci-
sion and succinctly disagreed: "the law of Art. III standing is built
on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers. 261
Therefore, the doctrine would provide an independent tool to
determine whether standing exists. 62 Contrary to Justice War-
ren's statement, under this view standing does work to exclude
256. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968). Justice Scalia rephrased this holding as
follows: "Standing... is only meant to assure that the courts can do their work well, and
not to assure that they keep out of affairs better left to other branches." Scalia, supra note
31, at 891.
257. This doctrine precludes judicial review of controversies "which revolve around
policy choices and value determinations" that the Constitution commits to either the
Congress or Executive. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986). See Louis Henkin, Is there a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 598-
99 (1976) (exists when there are no legally cognizable standards).
258. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 790-91
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). Justice Marshall, who dissented in Lujan,
took no part in Allen.
259. Id. See also Floyd, supra note 24, at 863-69 (contrasting Flast with Burger court
decisions that elevate separation of powers and federalism to primary roles in justiciability
decisions). For other Burger court expressions of separation of powers concerns, see Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (Powell, J.); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179
(1974) (Burger, C.J.); id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974) (Burger, C.J.); Valley Forge College v. Americans
United, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
260. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Burger, White,
Powell and Rehnquist. Comparing this conservative alignment to later cases shows that
Justices Scalia and Kennedy substituted for Justices Powell and Burger as part of Lujan's
conservative majority. By the time Air Courier was decided, Justice Brennan had retired.
His replacement, Justice Souter, was in the Air Courier majority. The conservative fold thus
increased and, with the retirement of Justice Marshall, is likely to increase further.
261. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (implicates the corollary doctrine of federalism: the Court stated the
proper forum was with "local authorities.").
262. Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 n.26 ("We disagree with Justice Stevens' suggestions that
separation of powers principles merely underlie standing requirements, have no role to
play in giving meaning to those requirements, and should be considered only under a
distinct justiciability analysis."). Justice O'Connor insisted, however, that the decision in
Allen rested on the causation and redressability requirements of injury in fact. Id.
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issues as well as persons. If every person who could raise an issue is
denied the right to litigate it, the issue is effectively excluded.
263
As such, separation of powers arguments can be raised to invali-
date an attempt to seek systemic relief from an agency's action or
inaction.26 4
A lawsuit seeking systemic relief is one that claims that a gen-
eral policy or pattern of action is not in accord with the law.
Because such illegality injures numerous parties, it could, to a cer-
tain extent, resemble a generalized complaint that the govern-
ment is not acting in accord with the law.265 To the Allen v.
Wright majority, allowing standing in such a situation would
improperly embroil the judiciary in the affairs of the executive:
[Standing] would pave the way generally for suits chal-
lenging, not specifically identifiable Government viola-
tions of law, but the particular programs agencies
establish to carry out their legal obligations. Such suits,
even when premised on allegations of several instances of
violations of law, are rarely if ever appropriate for fed-
eral-court adjudication. 'Carried to its logical end,
[respondents'] approach would have the federal courts as
virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and sound-
ness of Executive action. 266
263. Scalia, supra note 31, at 892. The example he gives is the denial of taxpayer
standing, which makes the legislative and executive branches solely responsible for
compliance with the constitutional requirement that "'a regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money... be published from time to time.'"
Id. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (taxpayer seeking information on
CIA expenditures in order to better fulfill duties of informed voter denied standing).
264. Professor Sunstein identifies, and argues against, three rationales for imbuing
standing with separation of powers concerns: courts should protect individual rights, courts
should not interfere with the executive who is to "take care" that laws are executed, and
the political process provides appropriate redress. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1469-74.
265. A generalized complaint is repeatedly declared to be insufficient to grant
standing. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 754. See generally Logan, supra note 32 at 47-48;
Floyd, supra note 24, at 871-75. The generalized harm barrier is particularly intractable
for several reasons. Even with generalized harm, some are more injured or offended than
others. Additionally, many cases in which "private" injury was found also have widely
shared injuries and diffuse impacts, such as the right to an abortion or to be free from
segregation or poll taxes. See Albert, supra note 35, at 483, 488 (shared injury not
equivalent to mere interest in matter). Moreover, the Supreme Court had stated that
standing should not be defeated simply because many are injured. United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
Professor Tushnet argues that the difficulties of litigation may discourage the individually
impacted plaintiff, such as an African-American who desired admittance to a particular
school. Delays may make the question moot as different career paths are taken.
Additionally, others similarly impacted naturally "free-ride" on a successful suit. Therefore,
the ideological plaintiff may be best because it may solicit support from the "free-riders"
and others benefitted. Tushnet, supra note 35, at 1709-12.
266. Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). In Laird,
the plaintiff claimed army surveillance of civilian political activity chilled his First
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court referred the plaintiff to Congress, which could
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Rather simplistically, this position maintains that only the Presi-
dent has the power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted. 12 67  This hands-off attitude ignores the fact that acting
illegally outside of the law is not proper "execution of the laws."'2 62
Taken to its extreme, this rigid view of separation of powers would
preclude all judicial review.269 But to accept that would be to
destroy the concept of a limited government 270 and eschew the
benefits that can derive from judicial review.2
Justice Scalia has explained his view of the judiciary in a
slightly different manner. He bases his analysis in separation of
powers, 2  but discovers the key not in the "take care" clause of
the Constitution, but in what he views to be the core role of courts.
To him, courts are uniquely suited to protecting rights of individu-
als and minorities.27 3 Therefore, a plaintiff must show a particu-
larized injury, one which, in Justice Scalia's words, "sets him apart
from the citizenry at large. '2 7 4 Such a standing requirement helps
courts maintain their proper role:
[It] roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemo-
cratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against
the impositions of the majority, and excludes them from
the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the
control matters through its committees and the power of the purse. Professor Nichol argues
that this aspect of standing analysis is misplaced: it deals with the justiciability of the claim,
not the propriety of the party. Nichol, supra note 33, at 99.
267. Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3). But see Sunstein, supra
note 113, at 670 ("take care" clause is a duty, not a license); Peter H. Lehner, Note, Judicial
Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 627, 631 (1983) (review of inaction is
not court policymaking but merely insuring implementation of statute).
268. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 794 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
It has been clear since Marbury v. Madison, that '[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' Deciding
whether the Treasury has violated a specific legal limitation on its enforcement
discretion does not intrude upon the prerogatives of the Executive, for in so
deciding we are merely saying 'what the law is.'
Id. (citations omitted).
269. Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Remedies: Lessons from the Environmental
Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984-85).
270. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1983).
271. For a discussion concerning the merits of judicial review, see Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522,
537; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 118, at 863-72.
272. Scalia, supra note 31, at 891 (Flast v. Cohen incorrectly severed standing from
separation of powers analysis). For a synthesis of Justice Scalia's decisions and scholarly
writing, see Poisner, supra note 212, at 353-57.
273. See Scalia, supra note 31, at 894. For a differing view of the role of judges, see
Chayes, supra note 57, at 1297 (new model of litigation for public law controversies); Owen
M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 29-30 (1979) (function of judge is to "give the proper meaning to our public values").
274. Scalia, supra note 31, at 881-82.
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other branches would function in order to serve the inter-
est of the majority itself.275
If a plaintiff shows only a generalized injury, one shared by the
majority of the public, then relief should be sought in other locales.
Again, if taken to an extreme, this position would create a constitu-
tional paradox: it would require submittal to a vote of the majority
issues that the Constitution intentionally removed from majority
control. 6
Nevertheless, to Justice Scalia, majoritarian grievances are to
be redressed in administrative or legislative venues: "Govern-
mental mischief whose effects are widely distributed is more read-
ily remedied through the political process and does not call into
play the distinctive function of the courts as guardians against
oppression of the few by the many."'2 77 Justice Scalia maintains
that courts should not protect the majority, because they are
unsuited to that task.
Justice Scalia, therefore, assigns majoritarian interests to the
political branches. He fears that if courts act when elected officials
did not, the judiciary would likely assert the particular values of
individual judges. 8 Judges, being politically unaccountable, are
inappropriate arbiters of values.279 Moreover, legislative initia-
tives can be lost in the halls of an executive agency within our sys-
275. Id. at 894.
276. Dow, supra note 35, at 1213-14. Additionally, political solutions may be
unavailable, especially when agency nonaction is at issue. See Note, supra note 267, at 639
(Congress, in public's view, already did its job by passing statute creating the agency).
277. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 467 U.S. 340 (1984). See also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.
Ct. 3177, 3190 (1990). Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (under
representative government, lack of judicial remedy does not mean no remedy exists;
although slow, electoral process is remedy). Once again, Justice Frankfurter is echoed: "In
a democratic society . . . , relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that
sears the conscience of the people's representatives." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (how to select representatives is a non-justiciable political
question).
278. Justice Scalia explained his view:
Where the courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do enforce upon the
executive branch adherence to legislative policies that the political process itself
would not enforce, they are likely (despite the best of intentions) to be enforcing
the political prejudices of their own class.
Scalia, supra note 31, at 896. But see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 118, at 864-65 (if
courts insist on Congress' will, judicial review is democratic); Poisner, supra note 212, at
374-78 (judicial review increases agency ability to accurately aggregate preferences by
making agencies more politically accountable).
279. Scalia, supra note 110, at 107 (arguing that judges should not decide levels of
environmental enforcement not because of any "unsuitability" to decide the issue, but
because judges are not politically accountable: '[T]he decisions are supposed to be political
ones--made by institutions whose managers change with each presidential election and
which are under the constant political pressure of the congressional authorization and
appropriations processes.").
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tem. If Congress does not respond, then it is what the majority
desired. 2 0  According to Justice Scalia, courts should not
intervene.
One barrier to court action is standing. It thus serves a separa-
tion of powers agenda by limiting lawsuits to those with concrete,
individualized harm.281 Justice Scalia once favorably quoted the
following from a 1944 case:
When Congress passes an act empowering administrative
agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of
those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted.
This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement
entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent nec-
essary to protect justiciable individual rights against
administrative action fairly beyond the granted
powers.
Viewed in this manner, separation of powers prevents the courts
from second-guessing generally applicable executive action. It is
up to the legislative branch to insist that agencies comply with the
intent of the laws it passes. 28 3
Lujan forwards Justice Scalia's separation of powers agenda in
two ways. First, Scalia insisted on a clear and unequivocal "injury
in fact" that would distinguish the plaintiffs and thus prove that
judicial intervention on their behalf was justified. To Justice
Scalia, this requires a showing that the plaintiffs were "harmed
more than the rest of us... [thus establishing a] basis for concern
280. Scalia, supra note 31, at 897. Scalia stated:
The ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of
social change, and the prohibition against such carelessness (believe it or not)
profoundly conservative. Sunday blue laws, for example, were widely
unenforced long before they were widely repealed-and had the first not been
possible the second might never have occurred.
Id. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 113, at 2088-89 (giving agencies interpretive authority may
allow changed circumstances to affect legislation in manner similar to common law growth).
But see Miller, supra note 27 at 398-99 (executive should not pick and choose laws but does
do so); Note, supra note 267, at 640 (judges, not legislators, are traditional interpreters of
past laws).
281. Cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1321 (noting separation of powers
arguments against private rights of action).
282. Scalia, supra note 31, at 883 (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944)). The
Stark Court allowed dairy producers to challenge milk settlement fund administration
despite the fact that the act did not expressly provide for judicial review at their behest.
The administrative action affected their payments directly, giving rise to personal rights
"not possessed by the people generally." Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944). This is
in contrast to the consumers that Scalia would deny had standing. Community Nutrition
Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. But, according to Justice Scalia, this insistence cannot be through legislative
vetoes. Antonin Scalia, In Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 684-95 (1976).
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that the majority is suppressing or ignoring the rights of a minority
that wants protection .... -28 Second, Scalia took the APA refer-
ence to "an agency action" as a precursor to judicial review and
elevated it to the point that "agency action" now presents an over-
riding requirement of particularity that must be met before a
court can intervene. 2 5 The APA does not necessarily require this
interpretation.
The APA defines "agency action" broadly. It includes "the
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act .... " Each of
these enumerated components of an "action" are defined. For
example, a "rule" is a wide category of activity: agency acts of
"general or particular applicability and future effect . ",287
Because the definition of "action" quoted above includes within its
scope "the equivalent" of each of the enumerated components, an
agency-sanctioned pattern of activity could be an "agency
action."2s If the pattern is designed to control future activities, it
would be the equivalent of a "rule."
Justice Scalia, however, seemingly requires specifically desig-
nated "orders" or "rules" in order to dignify agency activity with
the title "action. ''12 9 Moreover, in his ripeness analysis, when
faced with what undoubtedly was an agency "rule, ' 290 Scalia
apparently wanted an adjudicated decision on land use-an
"order" in APA terms291
-before he would proceed. This pre-
cludes early and systemic relief.
What Justice Scalia did in Lujan is akin to what Justice Rehn-
284. Scalia, supra note 31, at 894-95.
285. This tendency is related to some cases that deny standing to challenge police
practices because of a lack of concrete injury. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Justice
Rehnquist refused to see a connection between past violations of individual rights and
disciplinary policies of the police department that arguably could influence an unnamed
policeman to violate plaintiffs' rights again in the future. Id. at 367-72.
286. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988) (emphasis added).
287. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
288. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 678-79 (Heckler exception making "pattern" of
nonenforcement more reviewable than isolated refusal to act is because pattern equals an
assessment of Congressional intent).
289. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990) (Land Withdrawal
Review Program "does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a
completed universe of particular BLM orders and regulations"). Justice Scalia also
adamantly rejects judicially requiring the BLM to establish rules for public participation or
information dissemination when system-wide or general failures are alleged. To Justice
Scalia, any response to such an allegation would interfere with executive prerogatives:
"With regard to the alleged deficiencies in providing information and permitting public
participation, as with regard to the other illegalities alleged in the complaint, respondent
cannot demand a general judicial review of the BLM's day-to-day operations." Id. at 3194.
290. Id. at 3190. The agency rule was a Public Land Order or PLO. See supra notes
206-07 and accompanying text.
291. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1988).
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quist did in Air Courier. Both ratchet down the universe of poten-
tial challengers to agency action. The strict interpretation of the
"zone of interest" test is related to separation of powers because it
insists on concrete, individual cases as the crux of the judicial
realm. Nevertheless, Air Courier deserves further explication.
B. "BYSTANDER" STATUS RESURGENT
Initial standing doctrine limited challenges of agency action to
those who suffered legal wrong or who fell within the meaning of
the word "aggrieved" as specifically used in a particular statute. 9 2
This tended to allow the regulated to enter the courts, but many of
the beneficiaries of statutes were denied standing as mere
"bystanders. '293 As previously noted, Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations29 4 interpreted the APA as enlarging the
universe of potential plaintiffs; "adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute"295
meant those "arguably within the zone of interests of the relevant
statute. '296 Beneficiaries of statutes need not be mere bystanders
but those actually intended by Congress to enforce a statutory
scheme.297 Nevertheless, both recent Supreme Court cases make
it more difficult for someone other than the directly regulated to
enter a court. The cases narrow the largesse of these precedents.
The first mechanism for restricting review occurred through
Justice Scalia's insistence in Lujan on strict "ripeness." Unless
Congress specifically provides for earlier review, a regulation can-
not be judicially reviewed until "concrete effects" are felt.298 The
directly regulated will not feel the brunt of this as deeply as the
purported beneficiaries of a regulation because of the acknowl-
292. As then Judge Scalia phrased the pre-Data Processing view: "Quite evidently, one
cannot be 'adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of [a] statute' that does not
contain those-or at least substantially similar-words." Scalia, supra note 31, at 887-88.
293. This was, of course, a tautology: if one was a "bystander" one would not have
standing. See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1436, n.18.
294. 397 U.S. 150.
295. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
296. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. As then Judge Scalia put it, the
wording of the APA was interpreted to mean no more than 'adversely affected or aggrieved
in a respect which the statute sought to prevent.'" Scalia, supra note 31, at 889.
297. The "zone of interest" test so interpreted is broader than acknowledging
situations where an act actually creates rights. Statutes could in that manner directly create
"injuries": "The actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by
virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing .... "
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))). See
also Logan supra note 32, at 59-69 (Freedom of Information Act gave right to receive
information, which was not a common law right).
298. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190 (1990).
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edged exception to Scalia's ripeness requirement: review will be
appropriate when a substantive rule requires a plaintiff to immedi-
ately modify behavior.299 Obviously, it is the regulated who must
modify behavior, not the beneficiary of regulation.
The regulated will have quicker access to courts, but perhaps
more importantly, they also will always have standing. Justice
Scalia has stated that one who is "the very object of a law's require-
ment or prohibition" will be able to show an "individual" griev-
ance. 300 The timing preference and assured standing will tilt
agency action away from vigorous enforcement of statutes as agen-
cies seek to avoid lawsuits from those who can challenge them.
This defensive action may harm beneficiaries.30 '
Beneficiaries are further frustrated because standing is prob-
lematic for persons other than the regulated. Some injuries could
be deemed fortuitous in the sense that the law was designed for a
purpose other than to prevent that harm.30 2 Justice Scalia's hypo-
thetical in Lujan would amount to such an example.30 3 A require-
ment that hearings be held on the record is to ensure due process
for parties, not full employment for court reporters. Most cases
are not as clear-cut as this.
To address this problem, the "zone of interest" test was
designed to look at the relationship between the alleged harm and
the statute's purposes. For a judge who views the public's ability
to sue as a necessary "check" on the other branches of govern-
ment, broad relationships would suffice.30 4  For a judge that con-
299. Id. For a recent example of a case of standing for the regulated, see Gas
Appliance Mfrs. v. Department of Energy, 773 F. Supp. 461, 464 (D.D.C. 1991).
300. Scalia, supra note 31, at 894. "That is the classic case of the law bearing down
upon the individual himself, and the court will not pause to inquire whether the grievance
is a 'generalized' one." This contrasts with what Justice Scalia described as a "plaintiff...
complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a requirement or prohibition upon
someone else." Id. In the latter situation, unless some individual harm distinguishes the
plaintiff, Justice Scalia views the plaintiff as simply forwarding a majoritarian claim that acts
required by law or the Constitution are being withheld. Id. Compare Justice Rehnquist's
rationale in Heckler v. Chaney against review of a decision to not enforce an act: "When an
agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's
liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts are often called
upon to protect." Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
301. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1283-84 (1989) (agencies respond to
arguments of those who can challenge in court, not to others); Poisner, supra note 212, at
375-76 (unequal standing rights leads to unequal bargaining power before agencies). Cf
Note, supra note 267, at 643-44 (failure to review non-implementation skews administrative
law in favor of regulated).
302. Scalia, supra note 31, at 895.
303. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186. For the text of the example, see supra text at note 215.
304. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 338, 403 (1987) (White, J.)
(quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,347 (1984)). "[Clompetitors who
allege an injury that implicates the policies of the National Bank Act are very reasonable
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tends that courts do not entertain suits to rectify majoritarian
complaints, a philosophical quandary results if a statute has a very
broad zone of interest.
Justice Scalia, while a judge on the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, identified two types of statutes that could
have such broad spheres: statutes that seek to protect nothing but
"generalized interests," and ones that "benefit[] generalized inter-
ests through the protection of more particularized interests to
which it is immediately directed."'30 5 Under Justice Scalia's view,
classifying a statute ascertains who would have standing.
For the first type of statute, of which NEPA and its environ-
mental concerns are an example, Congress may have intended to
give standing to everyone impacted.3 °6 Justice Scalia doubted,
however, that Congress always would have meant to make other
large universes of persons "private attorneys general" simply
because of their concern with a statute's generalized benefits.30 7
Therefore, if the statute is of the second type, so that there are
direct and immediate beneficiaries, these persons and not the
more generalized indirect beneficiaries would have standing.
Even if the indirect beneficiaries have interests within the dis-
puted act's purposes, they should rely on those interests through
which their claims derive for judicial enforcement.3 ° s
candidates to seek review of the Comptroller's rulings. There is sound reason to infer that
Congress 'intended [this] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard
of the law.'" Id. See also Hutton, supra note 237, at 411-12 (discussing Justice white's view
of separation of powers).
305. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1984). (Scalia,
J., dissenting). He explains why the situation is likely to occur: "Almost any statute has
generalized indirect benefits; ultimate improvement of the society at large is the whole
theoretical justification for heeding the requests of 'special interests.'" Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. The zone of interest test is ultimately a way of apprising Congress' intent as to
who it anticipated would enforce the statute. See Scalia, supra note 31, at 896 (courts
should not presume Congress designated a minority group broad enough to include the
entire population).
308. Justice Scalia favorably cited Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 308 (1944). Scalia,
supra note 31, at 883. For a discussion of Stark, see supra note 282. In Stark, milk handlers
would not be interested in administration of the settlement fund, the issue in the case.
Hence, producer claims could not be protected "derivatively" by the handlers, who had
express rights to judicial review. Producers, therefore, had standing. Stark, 321 U.S. at 308.
In Community Nutrition Inst., Justice Scalia deemed the claims of consumers of milk to be
derived from interests of both the producers and the milk handlers. Consumer interest in a
high enough price to ensure a sufficient supply would be protected by the producers and
the milk handlers would protect their interest in avoiding artificially high prices.
Community Nutrition Inst., 698 F.2d at 1257 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although superficially
correct, if milk has inelastic demand, which for some portions of the population is or should
be true, then the milk handlers have no incentive to sue because they could pass on the
price they pay even if too high. To the Supreme Court, whether or not the handlers would
pass on savings they received from appealing would be irrelevant. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. at 352 n.3. This undercuts Justice Scalia's concept of derivative protection.
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These categorizations of types of beneficiaries and potential
plaintiffs are not new. In fact, Justice Scalia's arguments mirror
those of Justice Frankfurter:
Frequently governmental action directly affects the legal
interest of some person, and causes only a consequential
detriment to another. Whether the person consequen-
tially harmed can challenge the action is said to depend
on the 'directness' of the impact of the action on him.
[It is not true that only persons directly affected can
sue.] The likelihood that the interests of the petitioner
will be adequately protected by the person directly
affected is a relevant consideration... as is, probably, the
nature of the relationship involved.3 °9
Current conservative views on standing and justiciability again
reflect a prior era.
Moreover, the distinction between indirect or consequential
beneficiaries and immediate beneficiaries might answer the ques-
tion of who could have standing in Air Courier. Perhaps patrons of
a rural post office scheduled to close for lack of revenue or a
domestic mailer whose rates are being raised might be able to
object. These parties might be called the "immediate and direct
beneficiaries" of the act if one views the postal monopoly as
attempting to provide universal service at reasonable rates.3 10
These plaintiffs, however, might encounter difficulties with the
"fairly traceable" and "likely to be redressed" hurdles. A competi-
tor of a person using the exemption could object to the grant of
the exemption under earlier precedents, but perhaps not now.3 11
Liberal precedents have been modified.
In Air Courier, the Court looked directly to the "zone of inter-
est" test and read the statute narrowly. Moreover, at no time in
the opinion did the Court use the terminology "arguably within
In fact, the Supreme Court did not adopt his view, but based its decision on the statutory
scheme precluding additional remedies.
309. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 153-54 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J.). Ironically, Professor Scott identified this case as one in which those only
secondarily impacted were allowed standing. The organizations listed as subversive used
their own injuries to receive standing, but the more directly impacted parties were the
government employees who were told they could not join the organizations. Scott, supra
note 35, at 679-80.
310. See Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S.
Ct. 913, 913 (1991).
311. Justice Scalia, as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, objected to grants of competitor
standing. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739, 740
(D.C. Cir. 1985); 765 F.2d 1196, 1197 (1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1992]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1
the zone of interest." ' 2 Citing Lujan, it formulated the test to
require the unions to "show that they are within the zone of inter-
ests sought to be protected through the PES."3 1 3 The earlier use
of "arguable" apparently was designed to lower the test's thresh-
old.31 4 The recent linguistic change is significant: by removing
"arguable," the zone test merges with the private right of action
cases. Only direct beneficiaries will be able to meet the test.
Analyzing a statute to discover direct beneficiaries reflects
general concerns about judicial interference with the executive at
the behest of those with broad-based interests. It explains the
Supreme Court's attempt to put teeth in the previously tame
.,zone of interest" test. Also, both the zone test and its underlying
justifications display a concern for immediacy and individual
harm.3 5 Therefore, it might signal a change in another of the pru-
dential limitations on standing, namely, the inability to champion
the rights of third-parties.3 s 6 This criterion in the past was often
honored in the breach3 17 and viewed as a matter of degree. 1 8
Current trends suggest that the Supreme Court might strengthen
312. This terminology should have been used in the APA arena. Community Nutrition
Inst., 698 F.2d at 1256 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("zone of interest" test developed for APA
review with word "arguably"; Supreme Court only dropped "arguably" when test used as
prudential limitation in non-APA setting). See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 60 U.S.L.W.
4119, 4129 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stricter application in constitutional
arena).
313. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 917 (emphasis added) (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990)). See also id. at 918. ("Specifically, 'the plaintiff must establish
that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls
within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose
violation forms the legal basis of his complaint.' ") (quoting Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186).
314. Fletcher, supra note 35, at 263-64 ("arguably" means to presume standing).
315. Evidence of this lies in the Court's characterization of the PES as a "competition
statute that regulates the conduct of competitors of the Postal Service." Air Courier
Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 111 S. Ct. 913, 920 n.5 (1991).
Therefore, it could rely on other cases finding that employees are denied standing to
enforce competition laws "because they lack competitive and direct injury." Id.
316. See Floyd, supra note 24, at 891-93 (identifying it as a prudential limitation);
Monaghan, supra note 56, at 282 (many so-called third party cases actually involve first
party rights to interact with another or some other first party right; if not subject to such
reformulation, then allowing third party standing is judicial creation of private attorneys
general). See also Nichol, supra note 33, at 95-98 (problem also referred to as "issue
standing," because question is whether the plaintiff is proper party to raise the issue).
317. Two chains of thought were seemingly reconciled in dicta in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the Court stated that injury in fact is required for
standing, but those with standing may argue public interest on the merits. Id. at 737. See
also Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Reilly, 743 F. Supp. 933, 939 n.7
(D. Mass. 1990), reversed, Nos. 91-1257, 91-1269, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27942 (1st Cir. Nov.
25, 1991). Professor Davis maintained that modern courts generally allowed a plaintiff who
had standing to argue third-party rights. DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 24.14.
318. See Fletcher, supra note 35, at 243-45 (shippers in SCRAP were more directly
affected than the law students); Albert, supra note 35, at 465-66 (question is whether scope
and purpose of nonparty's protection give rise to derivative protection for his relationship
with plaintiff).
STANDING AND RIPENESS REVISITED
this barrier as it has others3 19
C. CONSOLIDATION OF THE PRIVATE LAW MODEL AND
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
The current conservative majority of the Supreme Court is
completing a re-institution of the private law model of standing.
Those suffering "legal wrong" will easily obtain standing.320 Prop-
erty and contract rights, which are most easily embraced within
this model, will be protected.32 ' Within limits, standing will also
be available for those especially noted by Congress. 322 Neverthe-
less, ripeness doctrine may limit review to individual actions
rather than allowing lawsuits to seek systemic relief. Standing and
ripeness, interpreted in this manner, further the majority's view
that under a government of distinct branches, the judiciary must
avoid even appearing to invade prerogatives of the other
branches.
Strict standing and ripeness analysis also may mark a resur-
gence of sovereign immunity in the guise of standing.323 In an
early article, Justice Scalia praised an opinion by Justice Brandeis
which seemingly limited sovereign immunity claims to arguments
against legislative action and delegated protection of the executive
to two doctrines: standing and the ministerial-discretionary
dichotomy.324 Use of standing in this manner would insulate the
agency from judicial review.325
Relating sovereign immunity to standing would begin with a
presumption against review. Nevertheless, on a superficial level,
Justice Scalia's refusal to allow standing in Lujan could seem ironic
in light of his earlier writings. Lujan involved a challenge to
actions of the Department of Interior. Justice Scalia's article noted
319. For a discussion of how strict "injury in fact" requirements affect this component
of standing, see infra text at notes 384-90.
320. See Scalia, supra note 31, at 881, 885 (arguing against bifurcating standing into
constitutional and prudential concerns: "As I would prefer to view the matter, the Court
must always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal right.").
321. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991) (stare decisis more important
for property and contracts where people rely on precedents than for procedural and
evidentiary rules).
322. Congress, however, cannot exceed the Constitution in granting standing.
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (can define as broadly as
Art. III permits). See Scalia, supra note 31, at 886 (case and controversy requirement limits
Congress); id. at 894 n.58 (broad grants of standing would resemble two branches ganging
up on the third, the executive).
323. Scalia, supra note 40, at 903-05 (standing can do the work of sovereign immunity).
324. Id. at 905-06 (discussing Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925)).
325. Cf. Fallon, supra note 79, at 24-30 (standing analysis displacing more flexible
doctrine of mootness in federal litigation predicated on past injuries).
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that sovereign immunity was almost never raised as a defense to
such suits. 326 Looking closer, however, there is consistency. The
cases allowing review of Interior decisions cited by Justice Scalia
involved individuals claiming they were denied specific
resources.3 27 The Lujan plaintiffs, of course, were not developers,
but preservers, and raised issues of general concern rather than
individual rights. Therefore, standing as a substitute for sovereign
immunity would reflect the private rights model of standing.
In addition to providing echoes of sovereign immunity,
restricting judicial access may, in a roundabout manner, be for-
warding the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine
requires that Congress cannot delegate legislative authority and
must confine administrative action by relatively precise stan-
dards. 328 No statute has been invalidated on the theory since
1935.329 The doctrine has, however, garnered some recent
express support.33 More importantly, the doctrine's aims are
underscored by the Supreme Court's standing and ripeness cases.
Denying judicial review will force Congress' hand.331
If no review may be had of a general agency program, Con-
gress will be forced to act if it is displeased with agency perform-
ance. Congress may act directly against the agency by restricting
its budget. To remove ripeness barriers, it may authorize courts to
review specific regulations immediately upon promulgation. 32
Restraints on standing and ripeness may require more congres-
sional action, but other Supreme Court pronouncements about the
relationship between the courts and agencies also could result in
326. Scalia, supra note 40, at 907-08.
327. Scalia, supra note 40, at 909 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)).
328. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1260-61 (doctrine promotes political
accountability and predictability for those benefitted or regulated).
329. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
330. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Indus. Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring.). For the pros and cons of reinstituting the doctrine, see
Symposium, The Uneasy Status of the Administrative Agencies, Part I, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
295-492 (1987). For criticisms, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 366-67 (1988) (a
"draconian" response; judicial review should mandate internal and budgetary consistency
to interpret statute); Pierce, supra note 118, at 489-502 (in abstract reinvigorating doctrine
appealing but impractical); Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 1205 (1981) (if reinstate and refuse to
allow generalities, Congress would pass less regulatory law).
331. Cf. Murchison, supra note 126, at 173 (ripeness forces Congress' hand); Kevin W.
Saunders, Agency Interpretations and Judicial Review: A Search for Limits On the
Controlling Effect Given Agency Constructions, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 769, 796-98 (1988)
(doctrine could apply to whether agency construction can have controlling weight on
judicial review).
332. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190 (1990) (Justice Scalia's
point that early intervention is only allowed when congressionally authorized).
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more specificity from Congress even without invalidating laws
333under the nondelegation doctrine. .
Congress is further challenged because the Chevron Doctrine
also insulates agencies from judicial interference. Under the Chev-
ron Doctrine, a court may not substitute its view of a statute's
meaning for that of the agency if the statute interpreted is ambig-
uous.3 3 4 More and more, statutes are found to have ambiguity of
some degree.33 5 This increases reliance on agency interpreta-
tion.336 Because the courts must compel an agency to implement
what Congress has clearly stated,337 Congress will have to author-
ize both actions and priorities explicitly and cease granting agen-
cies policy discretion 338 and execution discretion.339 To do so will
be difficult.3 40 Nevertheless, if Congress does not act with greater
specificity, it risks having its proposals misinterpreted.
The Supreme Court has modified not only judicial roles, but
also those of Congress through its cases delineating judicial review
of agency action. Chevron removes courts from active policing of
333. Chevron, which promotes this, does so perversely because it implicitly rejects the
argument that Congress cannot delegate resolution of policies to other branches. The
Chevron Court recognized that the policy at issue originated in the White House and
therefore confirmed the President's power to control agencies and make policy choices.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). See
also Pierce, supra note 118, at 505.
334. Chevron US.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 ("question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."). Justice Scalia
explains the case as informing Congress of who would resolve ambiguity so that it could
accept or modify the roles. Scalia, supra note 110, at 517.
335. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 118, at 859 (presumption of ambiguity);
Saunders, supra note 331, at 778-83 (final erosion of judicial review comes from ease with
which courts find ambiguity). But see Scalia, supra note 110, at 515 (finding ambiguity
requires court to compare competing interpretations "only when the court concludes that
the policy furthered by neither interpretation will be clearly 'better' (in the sense of
achieving what Congress apparently wished it to achieve)."); Sunstein, supra note 113, at
2091-92 (mere fact another plausible interpretation exists will not be sufficient ambiguity).
336. Professor Strauss explains this as a tendency by the Supreme Court to manage its
case load by relying on agencies that not only have "specialist" expertise, but have national
scope and thus can rein in disparate circuit courts. Strauss, supra note 16, at 1114-22, 1126.
337. Chevron US.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."). See also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (Supreme Court ruled that separation of powers precluded the Court
from employing equitable balancing: "Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has
decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws
and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.").
338. Koch, supra note 121, at 483-84 (policy discretion is the power to take action to
forward societal goals).
339. Id. at 479 (executing discretion is the power to fill in details from vague, general
or incomplete statutes).
340. Strauss, supra note 16, at 1116 (unrealistic to think Congress can correlate all
aspects of legal order). Professors Shapiro and Glicksman, however, argue that to a certain
extent Congress has already begun to legislate more specifically. Shapiro & Glicksman,
supra note 118, at 820 (primarily spurred by congressional displeasure with Reagan
appointees, not the Supreme Court).
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agency compliance with less than specific congressional intent.
Standing and ripeness decisions reflect the conservative Court's
concern with the role of the judiciary and seek to confine that role
to protecting individual rights that might be tramelled by agency
action. The decisions limit use of the courts to seek general
agency compliance with the will of Congress. In sum, the execu-
tive branch is strengthened and the other branches are weakened.
V. IMPACT ON LOWER COURTS
The lower courts have not rushed to deny standing dramati-
cally because of Lujan and Air Courier. There is, however, a sense
in the courts that they must tread carefully because of a subtext in
the cases. As a result, environmental cases may no longer have a
relaxed standing threshold.34 ' Some of the more intriguing post-
Lujan cases include Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duf-
fryn Terminals, Inc.,342 Sierra Club v. Yeutter,343 Sierra Club v.
Robertson, 4 4 City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration,345 and Conservation Law Foundation of
New England, Inc. v. Reilly.346
Public Interest Research Group generates interest more for
the fears expressed in its concurrence than its actual holding,
which was practical and pragmatic in finding standing for a citi-
zen's group, Public Interest Research Group (PIRG). It allowed
PIRG to pursue a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act 347 based
on numerous permit violations by Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.
(Powell). The only issue in the case was whether PIRG could
prove "injury in fact."' 348 The problem arose because the Kill Van
Kull, into which Powell discharged, is one of the most polluted
industrial waterways in the nation. Although pollution in the
waterway "injured" the aesthetic and recreational pursuits of
PIRG's members, they did not and could not trace the difficulty
solely to Powell's permit violations.349 Therefore, the "fairly trace-
341. For the argument that the Supreme Court had previously allowed a relatively
slight showing to suffice, see Perino, supra note 93, at 144.
342. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991).
343. 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).
344. 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
345. 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
346. 743 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mass. 1990), reversed, Nos. 91-1257, 91-1269, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27942 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1991).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
348. Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70
n.3 (1990) (prudential limitations immaterial because citizen suit provision "explicitly
confers standing to the limits of the constitution").
349. Id. at 71.
[Vol. 68:1
STANDING AND RIPENESS REVISITED
able" and "likely to be redressed" elements of the equation came
into play.
The Third Circuit ultimately found that these requirements
did not defeat standing. Although the court insisted that more
than a violation of the permit must be proven, causation for stand-
ing was not the equivalent of the doctrine in torts.35 ° Moreover,
the court found the injury to be redressable. Even if the waterway
would not be returned to pristine condition, both the injunction
against the specific violations and civil penalties would help. 35 1 To
not interpret the requirement in this manner would allow the
most polluted areas to never be addressed.
Judge Aldisert, in his concurrence, admitted this fact but
wrote to express his "nagging doubt about standing. ' 352 To him,
the Lujan Court had sent a distinct signal that rules of standing
were not to be made more lenient for environmental claims.353
The Supreme Court additionally warned courts not to assume that
general averments contained the particular facts needed to prove
an injury in fact.354 Therefore, Judge Aldisert worried that the
plaintiffs had not shown that their injury was "fairly traceable" to
Powell's permit violation: "Each member/plaintiff complained of
pollution in general .... [N]o individual plaintiff was able to say
that in this highly polluted waterway, the specific condition that
was the object of his or her complaint was caused by Powell Duf-
fryn.' '355 This proof of injury would be insufficient to charge one
lone defendant in any context other than an environmental
case.
356
Judge Aldisert senses that the Supreme Court is tightening
standing requirements despite the public interest character of
environmental claims. If his qualms are correct, it might be
impossible for any citizen to proceed against a known polluter of a
generally polluted area. The fear expressed in SCRAP 357 would
be a reality with a different twist: rather than denying relief
350. Id. at 72 (plaintiffs need not show "to a scientific certainty that defendant's
effluent, and defendant's effluent alone" caused plaintiff's harm).
351. Id. at 73 (civil penalties deter).
352. Id. at 83 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
353. Id. at 84.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 88-89.
356. Id. at 88.
357. "To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others
are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread government actions
could be questioned by nobody." United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
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because many are injured, relief would be denied because many
injure. .
This problem reappears in another form in City of Los Ange-
les v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration."' Cities,
states and environmental groups attacked the lack of an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) for decisions to lower Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) goals for mileage years 1987-88
and 1989. The statute at issue set a presumptive goal but allowed
the agency to set a lower level if it was the "maximum feasible. 3 9
On standing, the primary issue was whether the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) had standing based on injuries to its
membership from global warming:
According to the NRDC, the NHTSA's failure to prepare
an EIS creates the risk that the agency will overlook the
possibility that a CAFE standard below 27.5 mpg will lead
to an increase in fossil fuel combustion that will, in turn,
lead to a global increase in temperature, causing a rise in
sea level and a decrease in snow level that would damage
the shoreline, forests, and agriculture of California; and
these local consequences of such a global warming would
injure the NRDC's members who now use these features
of California for recreational and economic purposes
360
Judges Wald and D.H. Ginsburg disagreed on the causation ele-
ment of standing. According to Judge Ginsburg, to allow standing
in this instance would eliminate the standing requirement "for
anyone with the wit to shout 'global warming' in a crowded court-
house."1361 He considered the one m.p.g. difference to create a
maximum theoretical increase of greenhouse gases of less than one
percent. Because many third parties and independent variables
influence global warming, NRDC had the burden of showing that
but for the particular governmental action being challenged the
358. 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
359. City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 482
(D.C. Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the challenges failed. The cities and states had standing for
the first year based on their need to comply with the Clean Air Act, but lost on the merits.
Id. For the 1988-89 year, two judges found standing for the NRDC, but one judge who
admitted standing found that the claim was not meritorious. Id.
360. Id. at 483 (Ginsburg, J.). The specific local problems in California gave the
plaintiffs a sufficient geographical nexus for a world-wide problem. In this regard, Lujan
was distinguished. Id. at 494 (Wald, J.). Moreover, the judge found the injury to be
redressed was not the global warming phenomenon, which could not be delineated with
precision. The risk of overlooking a potential injury from failing to do environmental
studies was the injury. Id.
361. Id. at 484 (Ginsburg, J.).
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injury would not occur.362
Judge Wald disagreed both on what the evidence revealed
and the standard necessary to prove standing:
If... we force a NEPA plaintiff to prove or allege with
exquisite precision how the agency action "will [cause]
particular environmental effects, we would in essence be
requiring that the plaintiff conduct the same environmen-
tal investigation that he seeks in his suit to compel the
agency to undertake.". . . A demand for that degree of
certainty runs contrary to the broad remedial purposes of
NEPA and is inconsistent with NEPA's standing
jurisprudence.36 3
NRDC's data showed that a lower CAFE standard causes both gas-
oline consumption and carbon dioxide emissions to increase in
ways that "synergistically contribute to the likelihood that the
complained of environmental injuries will occur. '364 The debate
between the judges on the necessary level of proof of causation, as
Judge Wald notes, exemplifies problems regulatory beneficiaries
have in seeking relief from harms that are "probablistic and sys-
temic, with widespread impact ... 365
The third case, Sierra Club v. Robertson,366 confronted Lujan
more directly and sought to limit its scope. The plaintiffs appealed
adoption of a Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) for a
national forest because they objected to the plan's treatment of
timber management and timber sales.367 The Forest Service
alleged that the LRMP was not an agency action subject to review,
because it was a mere programmatic statement of intent'"
which "'does not commit the agency to conduct any ground dis-
turbing project.' ",368 It argued that Lujan changed prior law,
which had allowed review of such plans.369  The district court
362. Id. For a comparison, see earlier cases in which Judge Scalia dissented from a
grant of standing to challengers of other CAFE standards: In re Center for Auto Safety, 793
F.2d 1346, 1354 (1986); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
793 F.2d 1322, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (injury not personal and too attenuated; plaintiffs
cannot show that a change would force production of more fuel efficient automobiles). But
see Perino, supra note 93, at 171-72 (arguing that this was not an environmental case and
that Judge Scalia had easily allowed standing for environmentalists while on the D.C.
Circuit).
363. City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 496
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, J.).
364. Id. at 497.
365. Id. at 495 n.5.
366. 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
367. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
368. Id. at 553 (quoting the government brief).
369. Id.
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both distinguished Lujan and rejected the argument on pragmatic
grounds.
First, the district court noted that in Lujan there was a ques-
tion whether a program actually existed. Here, the LRMP was
definitely an "integrated plan. '3 7 0 Moreover, it was a statutory
prerequisite for timber sales.37 ' The fact that further implement-
ing measures might be needed, or that the LRMP could be
altered, did not automatically preclude review, even under Lujan.
The court cited Lujan for the proposition that orders or regula-
tions which would apply uniformly to individual actions may be
challenged when ripe.37 2 The LRMP was such an "action"
because it set guidelines for future site-specific management
decisions.
The district court in Sierra Club v. Robertson gave a second
reason for not adopting the Forest Service's interpretation of
Lujan. The court wanted to assure an effective remedy for the
plaintiffs. To await individual timber sales and then seek judicial
review on each sale individually would be costly. Moreover, if the
Forest Service would later withdraw individual sales, as it had
throughout the present controversy, the plaintiffs might never
have an opportunity to have their worries addressed. 3  Prag-
matic concerns forced the district court to allow judicial review of
allegations of systemic problems in timber management. The
court did not accept the answer that the plaintiffs should seek
redress through either Congress or the agency.
The fourth case, Conservation Law Foundation of New Eng-
land, Inc. v. Reilly,374 also refused to read Lujan as precluding far-
ranging relief at the district court level. A citizens' group chal-
lenged the Environmental Protection Agency's failure to comply
with a non-discretionary duty to list and rank federal hazardous
waste facilities.375 The EPA claimed that there was no injury in
fact and that one must be alleged for each site. The court rejected
both contentions. Unlike the situation in Lujan, however, the
court found that each site was a defined geographic area and
members who lived near various unassessed or unevaluated sites
370. Id. at 553-54.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 554 (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190 n.2
(1990)).
373. Id. at 554-55.
374. 743 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mass. 1990).
375. Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Reilly, 743 F. Supp. 933, 935
(D. Mass. 1990).
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alleged injury.3 76
More importantly, the court determined the scope of relief to
be national. The group could argue the public interest after prop-
erly invoking the court's jurisdiction by an individual injury.3 77
The citizen suit provision in the statute removed any prudential
limitation on the right to argue third party rights. The court main-
tained that Lujan did not affect this law, because it merely found
no individual injury: "There is not the slightest hint that if injury
in fact to particular individuals is established, the law of third party
standing ... was to be fundamentally altered sub silentio."378
On appeal, however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
agreed and found the plaintiffs had no standing to seek a nation-
wide injunction. 379  The First Circuit did not find that Lujan
directly foreclosed standing,38 0 but based its decision on the Arti-
cle III injury in fact requirement, which demands particularized
injury. 3 l To. the court, this meant that members residing near ten
sites could seek an injunction forcing assessment of those sites, but
injury with reference to such sites would not suffice to compel
action in regard to the remaining 830 sites. As an illustration, the
court noted that a plaintiff in Massachusetts could only have the
status of a "concerned bystander" in regard to public health con-
cerns from hazardous waste in Hawaii. 8 2 Separation of power
concerns motivated it to deny standing.383
The court of appeals in Conservation Law Foundation also
relied on the Supreme Court's rejection of pure public interest
standing, citing Sierra Club v. Morton.38 4 It quoted Sierra Club's
exegesis that requiring injury would not insulate agency action
from judicial review, but would put control in the hands of those
376. Id. at 938. The "injury" was that any potential harm from any site was unknown.
Id. Without the sites being evaluated, the members did not know if they should alter their
behavior in regard to the area. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Highway Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Judge Wald's definition of "injury") discussed in text
accompanying note 363. Judges continue to manipulate injury in fact to take into account
the special nature of regulatory harms. Id. at 494 n.5.
377. Conservation Law Found., 743 F. Supp. at 939.
378. Id. at 940 n.11.
379. Conservation Law Found. v. Reilly, Nos. 91-1257, 91-1269, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
27942 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1991).
380. The court characterized Lujan as holding that even if the affidavits of the
plaintiffs would have shown aggrievement, no standing would exist under the APA because
the "Land Withdrawal Review Program" was not a "final agency action." Id. at 13-14. As
predicted, the Supreme Court's "hypothetical" has become a holding.
381. Id. at 6-7.
382. Id. at 12.
383. Id. at 14-15 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)).
384. Id. at 16 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)).
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with "a direct stake in the outcome.13 8 5 The Conservation Law
Foundation appellate opinion ignores the more expansive dicta of
Sierra Club v. Morton, which maintained that once injury is
shown, the public interest may be argued.3 8 6 Therefore, Conser-
vation Law Foundation could signal a tightening of the restriction
against asserting the rights of third parties.38 7 Because the case
involves distinct federal facilities throughout the nation, however,
it could be distinguished from a case in which a party injured by a
specific action simply desires to raise issues more pertinent to
another. This focus on issues is the heart of the prudential limita-
tion against third party standing. Therefore, the district court's
insistence that Lujan did not change the law of third party stand-
ing388 might be unaffected by its reversal.
Nevertheless, Conservation Law Foundation is a significant
restriction on standing. The case was brought under a distinct citi-
zen suit provision that allows "any person" to seek redress for the
Environmental Protection Agency's failure to act.3 8 9 To require
individual injury for each of numerous generic failures would
undercut the remedy's efficacy.390 The First Circuit's insistence
on a distinct.and palpable injury throughout the nation in order to
obtain systemic relief strengthens all doctrinal barriers to standing.
One additional case bears mentioning3 9' and appears to have
been influenced by Lujan. The case refused to find an issue ripe
for resolution. Sierra Club v. Yeutter3 92 involved a clash over
385. Id.
386. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972). For a discussion of Sierra Club,
see infra note 422.
387. See supra notes 316-18.
388. Conservation Law Found. v. Reilly, 743 F. Supp. 933, 940-42, n. 11(1990).
389. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1991).
390. See Comments of the Plaintiff's Attorney, Stephen H. Burrington, 22 Env't Rep.
1935-36 (BNA) (Dec. 6, 1991). Burrington noted that individual suits would drive the EPA
to first consider sites that had been the subject of a suit regardless of other rational
priorities. Therefore, a class action suit might be the next avenue for the Foundation.
391. Other post-Lujan cases are of lesser note. See, e.g., People for Ethical Treatment
of Animals v. Department of Health & Human Serv., 917 F.2d 15, 17 (9th Cir. 1990) (no
standing based on use of broad area through which hazardous wastes that might be
generated by animal research pass). This SCRAP-like allegation of injury might not have
sufficed even without Lujan. Four cases hold that those not truly interested in the
environment do not come within the "zone of interest" of environmental laws. Sabine
River Auth. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 745 F. Supp. 388, 397 (E.D. Tex. 1990);
Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchase Council v. Alcock, 736 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Ga. 1990);
Association of Significantly Impacted Neighbors v. City of Livonia, 765 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.
Mich. 1991); North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239,
1243 (7th Cir. 1991). The last case is interesting because Judge Posner likens the concept of
primary beneficiaries to anti-trust cases; additionally, the "zone of interest" test is
compared to the common law tort principle that only allows people who belong to the class
that a law was designed to protect to allege a violation of a statutory duty of care. North
Shore Gas Co., 930 F.2d at 1243.
392. 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).
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whether wilderness areas in national forests had reserved water
rights and whether the Forest Service had to pursue these rights in
water adjudications. The government responded to the suit in the
alternative: either no reserved rights existed, or the decision to
not file in state adjudications was nonreviewable.39 3 The Tenth
Circuit found the Forest Service decision reviewable, but only on
the limited question of whether there was an irreconcilable threat
to the wilderness character of the area.394 Therefore, the case was
not yet ripe for review. Mixed questions of law and fact existed,395
and the Forest Service had not conclusively ruled out filing for
water rights if needed. Its current position was therefore
tentative.
Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit felt that the harm the
plaintiffs alleged was speculative.3 96 If harm is only speculative,
any judicial opinion would be an advisory one. The court believed
such opinions should be avoided, especially when the issue to be
resolved is a political one: "Because the existence of federal
reserved water rights based on the Wilderness Act is an important
public issue of great moment in Colorado, and because of the
uncertain and tenuous nature of the record, we conclude that for-
bearance is justified in this case."' 397 To the Tenth Circuit, the situ-
ation resembled that in Lujan.39 8 The circuit seemed to accept
that courts do not decide certain questions.
Despite some influence, the Supreme Court's standing and
ripeness decisions have not yet made it impossible for those seek-
ing systemic reform to enter the courthouse. If fact, some courts
chafe at the restrictions and actively distance themselves from
Lujan. Some courts, however, have noted the tone of the
Supreme Court and have been more cautious in determining ripe-
ness and injury in fact. Moreover, some courts have used the zone
393. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990).
394. Id. at 1414. "Because the Wilderness Act does not provide meaningful standards
to review all land and water management decisions, we hold that the Forest Service's
decision to use or not to use federal reserved water rights allegedly created by the
Wilderness Act is 'committed to agency discretion by law,' except in those situations where
the agency's conduct cannot be reconciled with the Act's mandate to preserve the
wilderness character of the wilderness area." Id.
395. Although whether reserved rights existed is a question of law, whether their
assertion is necessary to preserve wilderness character is not. Id. at 1417.
396. Id. at 1419 (no proof that concrete harm to land would follow because it is not
known when or if diversions would occur at locales that would injure wilderness qualities).
397. Id. at 1420 n.8.
398. Id. at 1421. "We find this case similar to Lujan. Both cases involve challenges to
the cumulative effect of numerous agency actions that allegedly render the actions illegal.
Both cases involve conjectural or speculative harms to the challenger. In light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lujan, we cannot say the Sierra Club's challenge to the Forest
Service's administration of the wilderness areas is ripe for review." Id.
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of interest test to control access.399
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions have aggressively continued
the trend of restricting access to the courts for parties complaining
of agency action but who are not directly regulated by the agency.
The Court is reaffirming the private rights model of standing. One
reason for this is that strictly interpreting standing and ripeness
doctrines is fundamental to the more general conservative
agenda.40 ° It reflects not only the current majority's belief in the
limited role of the judiciary, but also signals a resurgence in
respect for agency decisionmaking when Congress fails to make
clear-cut policy choices.
Despite the recent flurry of cases, the Supreme Court has not
completed its look at judicial access. It granted certiorari to
review Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan.401 On the merits, the case
presents the question of whether federal agencies involved in
activities in foreign lands must consult with the Secretary of Inte-
rior under the Endangered Species Act to "insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species. ... "402 As intriguing an issue as this may be, the case
also poses standing and ripeness questions that may further narrow
access for those seeking broad-based relief from agency action. As
with Lujan, the question was provocatively phrased:
[Do] respondents have standing to challenge a regulation
... that merely interprets the statutory obligations of fed-
eral agencies under Section 7(aX2) of the Endangered
Species Act,.. . [when] respondents have not challenged
any specific action by an agency upon [which] statutory
399. See supra note 391 (cases cited therein); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,
932 F.2d 920, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (plaintiff not within "zone" of patent law simply
because it emphasizes the public interest and benefit of patents); Dist. 2, Marine Engineers
Beneficial Ass'n v. Burnely, 936 F.2d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1991) (Jones Act protects
American seaman, not right of union to seek closed shops). But see City of St. Louis v.
Department of Transp., 936 F.2d 1528, 1532-33 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing city and unions to
challenge decision transferring routes from TWA without mentioning zone test; city's
airport and union members would be injured if TWA's viability hurt).
400. The Supreme Court has discussed standing when not argued by the parties.
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990). Cf. Comment, supra note 93, at
157 n.173 (Scalia wrote 18 opinions on standing in four years on the D.C. Court of Appeals).
401. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
402. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX2) (1973).
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obligations actually fall? 4 0 3
Unlike Lujan, there is no question that a distinct "agency action"
within the meaning of the APA existed: the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice promulgated a regulation defining "action" for the consulta-
tion duty and limited it to activities in the United States or on the
high seas.40 4 A regulation is defined as agency action that is sub-
ject to review.40 5 Therefore, the scope of review and ripeness
questions are clearly broached. 406
The government now seeks to limit review to specific
instances of a rule's application, rather than to its overall validity.
If an organization is only able to challenge a regulation by chal-
lenging an individual action, then litigation shatters into diffuse
pieces.40 7 Each circuit court of appeals could more easily arrive at
different conclusions about the specific action before it. 40 8 Agen-
cies may decide to acquiesce in only certain decisions.40 9
This limitation of a suit would cement the private rights
model of judicial access more definitely. The courts would not be
involved in public value determinations, which is not necessarily
an objectionable result.4 10 However, congressional value determi-
nations may be lost if beneficiaries of programs are precluded from
judicial review at the threshold level of standing. Courts will not
even be able to ascertain whether an agency is clearly violating
statutes rather than making a delegated policy choice. Not even a
deferential Chevron review will occur.
403. Petition for writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1424).
404. The regulatory definition is: "all activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, all or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas." 50
C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986).
405. See 5 U.S.C. § 501(4); id. at § 501(13).
406. In the case below, the government challenged whether an "injury in fact" existed.
The members, however, presented detailed affidavits that showed use of the land involved
in some foreign activities. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 120-121 (8th Cir.
1990). But see Arguments Before the Court, 60 U.S.L.W. 3451 Uan. 7, 1992) (injury in fact
questioned).
407. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988) (review cumulative
EIS in court and do not relegate plaintiff to administrative appeal of each mine plan
because that would be a questionable administrative remedy). See also Sheldon, supra note
144, at 1057 (fragmented suits likely to produce inconsistent results and have little overall
impact); Poisner, supra note 212, at 364-66 (exceedingly burdensome and can make
nationwide programs so divided up as to evade review).
408. Cf. Strauss, supra note 16, at 1115 (episodic review by one three-judge appeals
panel not likely to generate integrated view).
409. See id. at 1110-16.
410. Either Congress or the agency should make actual factual allocations of limited
resources, which require value judgments because these types of entities can best balance
competing interests over a wide spectrum. Courts are limited by both lack of expertise and
the scope of the controversy before it. See Marla E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property
Rights: Lessons from Public Land Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 91 (1991).
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Judicial review is a necessary component of the checks and
balances of our system. Congress cannot micro-manage every
agency. People voting for the executive branch merely vote for a
president, and such vote cannot reflect either approval or disap-
proval of the myriad of decisions agencies have or will make in a
four-year term.
By limiting access to courts, in conjunction with demanding
judicial deference to agency interpretations, the Supreme Court
has removed an important "check and balance" on the executive
and also threatened congressional prerogatives. The Court deni-
grates an important judicial function, namely, that of telling what
the law is, in favor of limiting the judicial role to protection of indi-
vidual rights. Restricted judicial access and restricted judicial
review enfeeble not only the judiciary, but Congress as well. The
voice of Congress may be lost unless it reasserts its priority in poli-
cymaking. The Court itself mutes the voice of the judiciary as it
swings the pendulum of power toward the executive.41 1
APPENDIX
A. THE PURPORTED "BLACK LETrER" LAW OF STANDING
Standing rules are, to a certain extent, easy to state, but they
are not necessarily easy to explain. 412 This Appendix will provide
the purported rules garnered by taking the Supreme Court's
words literally without examining inconsistencies in application.41 3
According to the Supreme Court's ostensible rules, standing ques-
tions have two parts.41 4
The first facet has constitutional import: without an injury in
fact, there is no "case or controversy" and hence no federal court
jurisdiction.41 5 In order to have a "personal stake" in the question,
the prospective plaintiff must be among those affected by the
action. If this were not required, then the courts purportedly
would become mere debating societies. A generalized interest in
411. Strauss, supra note 245, at 604 (continual flex, growth and competition between
branches).
412. As one environmental practitioner put it, "it is still easier to plead standing than
to discuss it." Sheldon, supra note 144, at 10558. See also Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue
are largely worthless as such.")
413. Cf. Fallon, supra note 79, at 16 (some uniformity exists in verbal expression of
rules despite variation in application).
414. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ("The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of constitutional
requirements and prudential considerations.").
415. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("a core component derived directly
from the Constitution").
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a topic, no matter how strong, however, cannot suffice for standing
without injury.416 Supposedly, the inquiry into whether an injury
exists is not normative but a purely factual exercise.41 7 Standing is
thus to be a preliminary matter divorced from the merits of the
case.
418
Two refinements theoretically clarify the injury in fact
requirement. First, the questioned agency action must have
caused the injury. Moreover, the relief requested must be capable
of redressing the complained of injury. The first of these elements
is the "causation" or "fairly traceable" requirement and the sec-
ond is the "redressability" requirement.4 19 In theory, without
such proof, the plaintiff was not truly "injured" by the agency
action.
An injury .may be grounded in economics, that is, a loss of
money or property. 420 This would be analogous to harms that fit
traditional common law causes of actions. Moreover, injuries to
aesthetics and environmental concerns will also suffice. 421 Never-
theless, in order to be a proper plaintiff, not only must an injury be
caused by the agency action and be redressable by the court, but
the plaintiff must be counted "among the injured."' 42 In cases
416. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473. But see Winter, supra note 29, at 1394-1417 (at
time of Constitution, courts did allow public enforcement of rights); DAVIS, supra note 33,
at § 24:5 (advisory opinions given at time of Constitution).
417. Nichol, supra note 126, at 158-59 (injury test designed in theory to be "an
objective, concrete, independent barrier" that removes Article III "case" determination
from decision on merits). But see Fletcher, supra note 35, at 231-33 (injury determination
is normative and related to whether legal right exists).
418. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 153 (standing differs
from legal interest test, which looks at merits); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484 (rejecting
contention that various constitutional values may justify a "sliding scale" of standing).
419. Equating causation with "traceable" alone and separately treating redressability is
not universal. In the past, "fairly traceable" and "redressability" were treated as two
aspects of causation:
To the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the causal
connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury,
whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury
and the judicial relief requested .... Even if the relief respondents request
might have a substantial effect on the desegregation of public schools, whatever
deficiencies exist in the opportunities for desegregated education for
respondents' children might not be traceable to IRS violations of law-grants of
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools in respondents' communities.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19 (plaintiffs sought to challenge IRS regulations as interfering with
their children's ability to attend a desegregated school).
420. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1972) ("palpable economic injuries"
justify standing).
421. Id. at 734.
422. Id. at 735, 738. The requirement "serve[s] at least a rough attempt to put the
decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in
the outcome." Id. at 740. For a defense of standing requirements as preserving autonomy,
see Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REV. 297 (1979).
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dealing with natural resources, generally this means that the plain-
tiff uses resources that the agency action would impact.42 3
An injury in fact to the plaintiff provides the minimum indicia
of Article III standing.424 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
enumerated prudential limitations on standing,425 which Congress
may eliminate by legislatively granting standing.426 The pruden-
tial limitations, if operative, are designed to meet needs of the
judiciary itself.427 Therefore, they are grounded in the premise
that standing rules should foster adversariness in a concrete set-
ting.42 8 Through the prudential inquiry, the court determines
whether the party is the appropriate one to assert the substantive
issue.429 Standing will be denied prudentially if the injury is a gen-
eralized grievance,4 30 if the plaintiff is asserting the rights of third
parties,431 or the injury is not within the "zone of interest" of the
"relevant statute. 43 2
This last prudential concern, the "zone of interest" test, arose
in the context of administrative review.433 In an interconnected
society, any agency action could affect a myriad of people. There-
fore, the Supreme Court felt the complained of injury should at
least "arguably" fall within the zone of interests the statute is to
protect or regulate.43 4 In explicating this test, the Supreme Court
423. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735.
424. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
425. Id. at 474.
426. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 584
(1982); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
See also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (statute intended
standing to limits of Article III; only injury in fact needed).
427. The doctrines theoretically promote separation of powers and allocate judicial
resources efficiently. Rationales include avoiding judicial entanglement in politics and
preventing the court from using up its "'moral capital." Logan, supra note 32, at 47-48.
428. As stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968):
The 'gist of the question of standing' is whether the party seeking relief had
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.'
Baker v, Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).... So stated, the standing requirement
is closely related to, although more general than, the rule that federal courts will
not entertain friendly suits, or those which are feigned or collusive in nature.
Id. (citations omitted).
429. Nichol, supra note 126, at 160.
430. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
431. Id. at 474.
432. Id. at 475. See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
433. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 153. See also Clarke v.
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987) (test is primarily for APA and not
universal despite some reference to it in constitutional cases).
434. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 153. For a defense of
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stated in 1987 that it was not meant to be onerous.435 In fact,
applications of the test should reflect the legislative trend to
expand the categories of persons entitled to judicial review.
Review was to be denied only if the plaintiff's interests were "so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in
the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
intended to permit the suit." 436
One reason the Supreme Court gave for broadly interpreting
standing to protest agency action was the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) of 1946.437 To the Court, the APA was a "gener-
ous" grant of standing.438 Under the APA, judicial review exists
for "[any] person suffering a legal wrong... or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute .... -431 "Injury in fact" can show aggrievement or adverse
effect.440 The APA also impacts the second aspect of standing-
prudential limitations. They should be interpreted in light of
another APA section which provides that judicial review will be
available for actions for which there is no other remedy. 44
Review is the norm, with limited exceptions.
Nevertheless, in order to seek judicial intervention under the
APA, there must be two things: an agency "action" and, addition-
ally, this "action" must be "final. ' 442  The APA states that an
"agency action" includes any "rule, '443 defined by the Act as "an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or pol-
icy."'4 44 The APA does not define "final,, 445 but the Supreme
the test as a principled constitutional basis on which to limit the class of plaintiffs, see Floyd,
supra note 24, at 887-91. But see Albert, supra note 35, at 492 (determining cognizable
injury from policy of statutory and constitutional guarantees should be done under rubric of
whether claim exists, not as a threshold matter of standing).
435. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396-97 (referring to Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 153-54).
436. Id. at 399-400. The case continues: "The test is not meant to be especially
demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit
the would-be plaintiff." Id. In 1987, one commentator observed that the "zone of interest"
test restricted almost nothing. Perino, supra note 93, at 143-44.
437. Codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (1988).
438. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395 n.9.
439. 5 U.S.C. 702. See also Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395. (APA applies to "aggrieved"
persons even if relevant act makes no such reference and when it does not directly provide
for review.)
440. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973). " 'Injury in fact' reflects the statutory requirement that a
person be 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved.'" Id.
441. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
442. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
443. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
444. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
445. It does state, however, that if an agency review procedure does not stay the
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Court has declared that a determination of "finality" should be
made "in a pragmatic way."4 4 6  The quest for a final action
attempts to conserve judicial resources and ensure that a concrete
and focused event exists for the court to review. Therefore, the
concept of finality also is related to the doctrine of ripeness.
B. THE PURPORTED "BLACK LETTER" LAW OF RIPENESS
"Standing" deals with the "who" of a lawsuit; "ripeness- 447
deals with the "when. '448 It is generally considered a prudential
limitation on judicial action, although the Supreme Court has occa-
sionally hinted that ripeness derives from the "cases" and "contro-
versy" language of Article III.449  Nevertheless, its primary
justifications are pragmatic. The doctrine seeks to protect all three
players in any dispute:
[I]ts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been for-
malized and its effects felt in a concrete way by challeng-
ing parties.45 °
It tries to avoid judicial embroilment in inappropriate areas, to
allow an agency to proceed to formal action, and to assure that the
private party knows the true impact of an agency's action.
Since the 1967 Abbot Laboratories decision,45 1 determining
whether an action is ripe for judicial review generally requires two
inquiries: the evaluation of "both the fitness of the issues for judi-
cial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.145 2  The first criterion may be related to other jus-
ticiability problems, such as the political question doctrine.453
effectiveness of a decision during the pendency of an appeal, the original decision could be
deemed "final" for purposes of judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
446. Abbott Lab., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
447. As with "standing," current commentators speak of this justiciability concept as
being a metaphor. Compare Winter, supra note 29, with Murchison, supra note 126, at 174
(ripeness as metaphor acknowledges time, which thus acknowledges political nature of
administration).
448. It is therefore related to exhaustion of remedies and primary jurisdiction, which
also have timing elements. See Gelpe, supra note 269, at 8-10.
449. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978). See Nichol, supra
note 126, at 163 (criticizing attempt to constitutionalize doctrine).
450. Abbot Lab., Inc., 387 U.S. at 148-49.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 149.
453. See generally Henkin, supra note 257.
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Issue appraisal in the ripeness context, however, often centers on
whether the question is one of law.454 The second criterion-
hardship to the parties-looks to difficulties that either prompt or
delayed review would create for either the private party or the
agency.4 5 In essence, it may ask whether the situation would ever
be better suited for judicial intervention.456
Three cases decided together in 1967,4s 7 to a certain extent,
explain how the two-fold inquiry would work.458 In the so-called
"Abbot trilogy," two regulations were found to be ripe for review
before a Federal Drug Enforcement action to enforce the regula-
tions. The third was not ripe for pre-enforcement review.
One ripe regulation required drug manufacturers to use the
generic drug name on labels whenever the proprietary name was
used. The Court found this had an immediate and expensive
impact on the day-to-day activities of the drug companies. More-
over, they would risk a substantial sanction if they did not com-
ply.45 9 The second regulation defined color additives under a
statute that required clearance before such additives could be
used.460 To the Court, the regulation was ripe because it was "self-
executing, and... [had] an immediate and substantial impact." 46 1
In both instances, the primary issue was whether the regulations
were within the legislative intent of the statute.46 2
In the third case, the Court refused to allow pre-enforcement
review of a regulation that required free access to manufacturing
454. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983).
455. See, e.g., Lotz Realty Co. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 692, 697 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(Corps of Engineers' decision that individual permit is needed is not final action because
judicial review "would burden the agency by 'diverting manpower from its normal
functions.").
456. Duke Power discusses whether a nuclear accident with damages in excess of the
statutory liability limits is needed before determining if the limit was constitutional:
[D]elayed resolution of these issues.., would frustrate one of the key purposes of
the Price-Anderson Act-the elimination of doubt concerning the scope of
private liability in the event of a major nuclear accident .... Since we are
persuaded that 'we will be in no better position later than we are now' to decide
this question, . . . we hold that it is presently ripe for adjudication.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978).
457. Abbot Lab., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 167 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
458. But see Murchison, supra note 126, at 160.
459. Abbot Lab., Inc., 387 U.S. at 153-54.
460. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 167 (1967).
461. Id. at 171.
462. Abbot Lab., Inc., 387 U.S. at 149. ("[B]oth sides have approached this case as
purely one of [legislative] intent"). Additionally, in both cases, the agency had reached an
authoritative position that did not have to be elaborated.
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facilities and formulas.463 In contrast to the findings on the other
two regulations, here the Court found no immediate consequence
for the regulated entities. There had been no specific inspection
challenged, no one had refused to permit an inspection, and no
certification had been suspended as a result of a failure to allow an
inspection.46 4 Although the issue of whether the regulation was
authorized would eventually be a question of law, facts needed to
be developed on several fronts in order to understand the legal
justification for the regulation.46 5 Therefore, the inquiry required
more than a mere examination of legislative intent. Balancing
equities required delay. The private parties were not immediately
harmed, but early review could harm the agency because it might
curtail the agency's ability to develop its position.
The two-part Abbot formula, therefore, allows for flexible
results. Courts still tend to cite the formula to apprise whether a
case is ripe. They look to the fitness of the issues for judicial resolu-
tion and the hardship to parties.466 Although the Abbot cases dealt
with regulations promulgated after notice and comment, review
of less formal agency action has also been found ripe when it was
an authoritative statement of agency policy.467 At times the ques-
tion comes down to whether or not waiting for subsequent actions
would "significantly advance... [a court's] ability to deal with the
legal issues presented ... [or] aid in their resolution. 468
463. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 158 (1967). Loss of certification was
possible if a company did not comply.
464. Id. at 163.
465. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. at 163-64. The regulation was promulgated under
general authority to regulate "for the efficient enforcement" of the relevant act, thus
requiring investigation of both the statutory purpose and FDA's enforcement scheme. The
latter requires:
[Aln understanding of what types of enforcement problems are encountered by
the FDA, the need for various sorts of supervision in order to effectuate the goals
of the Act, and the safeguards devised to protect legitimate trade secrets.
Id.
466. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 801 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1986); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987); Air New Zealand Ltd. v. CAB, 726 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
467. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d
689, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
468. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978) (discussing
whether waiting for a nuclear accident with damages in excess of the statutory liability
limits would be necessary). For a discussion of the flip-side: that harm could occur from
delay, see supra note 456.
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